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Violet is Hopeftil for Change:
Social Media and Barack Obama's 2008 U.S. Presidential Election Campaign
David Godsall
This thesis explores the use of social media technologies like Facebook by Barack
Obama's Presidential campaign and its supporters in the 2008 U.S. General Election.
By investigating the social and technological forces driving ongoing changes in the
modes of communication used by campaigns and supporters, I argue that the 2008
Presidential campaign was the first major American electoral event in which social
media, as I define them, were a significant factor. I also examine the specific
structural and rhetorical properties of the campaign's communications strategy in
order to determine what efforts to promote the flow of its messages into and
throughout social mediascapes the campaign may have made. My primary research is
composed of interviews with young Obama supporters volunteering with the
campaign in New Hampshire in the final week of the election period. I conclude from
this research that a potentially transformative pattern of communicating with the
campaign and with peers characterizes the habits of political expression displayed and
described by these young people. Using Facebook, my interview subjectes integrated
political signifiers appropriated from the campaign's messaging and branding into
their own identities, creating potentially powerful and pervasive new flows of
influence within their online communities.
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Introduction
Throughout 2008, I saw Barack Obama everywhere I turned. Images,
messages, sounds and every other species of signifier imaginable permeated my
world with Hope and Change, amongst the many other Obama-branded political
tropes. As a passionate supporter of the campaign, I often consciously immersed
myself in mediascapes that were saturated with these signifiers, but I didn't have to
seek them out. They seemed to follow me everywhere I went, both virtually and
physically, borne by social mobility that I at first attributed (simplistically) to
widespread excitement about an historic election and enthusiasm for an impressive
candidate. What I didn't yet realize when I started to notice this saturation of my own
communicative ecosystem was that many of my peers who weren't as engaged in the
election narrative and drama as I was—many of them Canadians like me with very
little directly at stake in the outcome—were feeling like they had unwittingly plunged
into the Obama pool as well. It was almost inescapable.
All this would seem obvious if the mediascapes in question were those
occupied by traditional media. 'Traditional', of course, is a problematic term, since it
implies that some universal tradition governs certain media. For the sake of clarity,
then, I'll define them by what they are not, new media. But they are not part of any
tradition of mine, either. I am a consumer of messages and images mediated by the
various online social mediascapes I habitually inhabit. These include Facebook and
Twitter, but also social bookmarking sites and aggregators like Digg.com, all of
which provide a social reference process for filtering the content I consume according
1
to the tastes of specific people whose opinions I trust or groups of people whose
collective opinions seem to correspond, however loosely, with mine. Most of the
traditional media I consume is filtered according to these processes. If I'd been
watching broadcast television, for example, it would be easier to explain why I spent
the year soaked in Obama branding. But I wasn't; most of what G was consuming had
been mediated by peers, a group consisting primarily of university-educated people
under the age of 30 whose tastes typically exclude mass media.
Dissecting, examining, and reverse-engineering the 2008 Obama campaign is
a pursuit that has, in the past year, launched hundreds of books and articles—scholars
and journalists have been working feverishly to understand the formula that produced
his successes. (From Richard Wolffe's (2009) bestselling campaign narrative
subtitled "The Making of a President" to Colin Delany's (2009) widely circulated
Learningfrom Obama web book, the publishing industry appears to have received a
defacto bailout to compensate for the lean times of the Bush era.) These texts largely
focus on matching specific tactics deployed by the campaign with social,
technological, political, or cultural trends thought to have made them more effective.
I've yet to encounter an explanation of the overwhelming social momentum the
campaign built that doesn't defer to the candidate's unique charisma or the country's
perceived ripeness for Change to account for the sustained saturation of email
inboxes, Facebook news feeds and blog comment rolls with re-produced, remixed,
satirized, or otherwise socially mediated Obama messages and images. Obama is a
charismatic politician and America was ripe for change, but these explanations
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become less satisfying when they are confronted with the breadth and depth of the
social phenomenon the campaign catalyzed.
The primary impetus for this thesis was this sense that the social and cultural
dimensions of the campaign had yet to be adequately examined and this impetus, in
turn, led me to an investigation of the technological and demographic dimensions of
the campaign. Young Americans suddenly became more engaged in politics and civic
issues than they had been in a generation, partially because they had just been
introduced to a uniquely engaging politician, but there was also something new in the
way they constructed their relationship with the candidate and the campaign. And, at
the risk of ascribing excessive importance to a technological change, it is arguably
significant that usage of social networking sites among American adults (now one in
three) quadrupled between the 2004 and 2008 Presidential elections (Smith, 2009:17).
In this thesis I argue that the maturation and widespread adoption of social media,
particularly among young Americans, enabled more intimate and personal
relationships (or at least the feeling of more intimate and personal relationships) with
politicians and political campaigns than those that would have been possible to build
using only traditional media.1 The Obama campaign's communications strategy was
designed in part to exploit the potential of social media's ascendance by fostering
For the purposes of this thesis the term "social media" includes the user-generated content
(UGC) sites like YouTube that are typically associated with Web 2.0 and social networking
utilities/sites (SGS) like Facebook and Twitter, as well as various other media organized
primarily according to relationships between users.
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these new kinds of relationships with messaging tactics that promoted a sense of
belonging in the imagined community of the campaign.2
It's not new that a political campaign would try to build a sense of community
around its goals, but the sheer size of the community Obama created was new. Colin
Delany, political consultant and editor of the internet politics website
epolitics.com, notes that the campaign's email list, composed of supporters who
deliberately "opted-in" to the campaign's online communications regime, had more
than 13 million names on it. And on November 4th, 2008, Obama had 2,401,386
"friends" on the social networking site Facebook, almost four times the number his
opponent garnered (techPresident, 2009). These successes are certainly a reflection
of the candidate's general popularity, but they must also be evidence of a particular
aptitude for building community online and engaging the people more likely to get
their information about politics online than from traditional media and who are also
most likely to communicate their opinions online: Americans between the ages of 1 8
and 30 (Smith, 2009; 15). So if Obama' s success in forming online community can be
assumed to have contributed to his electoral success and young Americans (among
whom Facebook was the most popular social networking site in 2008) is
proportionately composed of the online participatory class, then the pursuit of a better
understanding of how politics and political signifiers were communicated within the
2 The term "imagined communities" was coined by Benedict Anderson in his 1 983 book
examining the origins of nationalism and the forces behind the spread of nationalistic
sentiment. He argues that nations are socially constructed by imagining shared threads of
identity and I use his idea in this thesis to apply the same concept to groups of Obama
supporters.
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online communities these young people inhabited is a potentially important
undertaking (Smith, 2009; 13).
One of the primary assertions of this thesis is that there is something new
about this pattern of political communication. Some people will always be motivated
to actively project their political opinions in ways intended to influence their peers;
for these people, social media are simply new channels requiring new rhetorical
tactics. Utilities like Facebook certainly offer these political evangelists powerful
tools and one of the purposes of this thesis is to examine how politically committed
young people used social media. People who are willing and motivated to actively
project their politics and persuade their peers, however, are perennially mobilized and
energized; they can only explain a limited part of the Obama phenomenon. I argue
that the more passive persuasion tactics marshaled by Facebook users who are not
typically inclined to project political signifiers was more likely to have been
responsible for the scale of the Obama movement. Social media provided new tools
that enabled these people to influence their peers without investing the energy (or
exposing themselves to the potential social complexities and pitfalls) associated with
active persuasion. These people were able to influence their peers as a byproduct of
their normal process of curating their online identities.
Facebook in particular is a venue for this kind of influence because many of
its tools are designed to let users describe themselves in public ways. Chris Hughes,
one of the four founders of Facebook, remarked that one of the site's advantages is
that "you get to fashion yourself in a new way in a new space. It's not about changing
who you are. It's about emphasizing different aspects of your personality" (Cassidy,
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2006). And one of the aspects of their personalities that many American young people
chose to emphasize in 2008 was their politics. Over the course of the election, 14% of
Americans used social networking sites (again, Facebook being the most popular) and
more than half of those used social media "for political information or to take part in
the some aspect of the campaign" (Smith, 2009:35). In this thesis I consider whether
the relative ubiquity of political expression in social mediascapes might, in the case of
Facebook, be promoted by both the software itself and the social conventions
governing its use. Do features like the "status" update tool condition the proliferation
of political messages into and throughout Facebook' s mediascape? If so, then the
most popular social networking utility among American young people is in some
ways an intrinsically political place and the implications for youth civic engagement
are significant.
In some ways, Facebook is self-evidently political. When users create a new
account, "Political Views" are among the basic pieces of information about
themselves they are asked to provide. It is one of the assumptions encoded in the site
that our politics are part of how we will choose to construct the identities our peers
will see. And that our peers will see them makes Facebook a venue for new flows of
political influence. The "status" update feature is a particularly instructive example of
this dynamic: supporters were able to broadcast messages like "Violet is hopeful for
change!" throughout their communities, potentially reaching hundreds of their peers
with the campaign's stock tropes appropriated and remixed according to the
conventions of the form, while performing the mundane everyday maintenance of
their online identities. The Obama campaign benefitted from a unique understanding
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of both the social and technological dimensions of Facebook politics, at least partially
because one of its senior figures helped to establish them. (In 2007, Chris Hughes,
left Facebook for Chicago to lead Obama's new media team.) Still, I do not intend to
argue that the Obama's campaign's successes can be attributed solely to their ability
to capitalize on the ascendance of Facebook. My goal instead is to understand how
these successes exemplify larger shifts in the ways future political communities and
political movements will be constructed and mobilized.
This thesis is organized according to three central research questions, each
corresponding with one of three chapters. First, what are the underlying technological
trends and relevant changes in the American media landscape that created the
conditions for the Obama campaign to build its online imagined community? Chapter
1 is concerned primarily with the evolution in political communication that took place
between the 2000 Presidential election and the 2008 Presidential election. This was
the period in which political campaigns, like all content creators, were compelled to
adapt to the shifting of American attention from traditional media to online media. I
argue that this broader shift encompassed two salient changes that transformed the
practice of political messaging in advance of Obama's Presidential bid: first, the
fragmentation of audiences and early indications of the potential decline of
conventional mass media forced campaigners to begin targeting smaller groups with
strategically tailored messages and, second, the maturation of social media beginning
in 2004 meant that campaigners would have to begin building communication
strategies that could accommodate their surrender of control over their signifiers.
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The second question pertains to the Obama campaign's responses to these
trends. Every new medium challenges political communicators to tailor the form and
content of their messages to its most effective use. So in what ways did the Obama
campaign's communications strategy involve tactics that accommodated or promoted
the social mediation of its messages? In Chapter 2, I examine the specific rhetorical
and structural properties of the campaign's messaging regime in order to identify the
tactics that may have contributed to their social media presence. I argue that the
Obama campaign's communications strategy reflected early recognition of a
potentially widespread future return to a two-step flow of communication, similar to
the pattern described by Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld in their influential treatise
Personal Influence. The two steps I identify, however, differ from the social
referencing process they described in 1955 in that messages must now penetrate
social mediascapes in order to achieve the first step. I argue that the two notable
rhetorical features of this strategy were the reliance on Aristotelian ethos as a means
of constructing a social media-friendly brand and the use of what I refer to as the
syntax of solidarity to foster imagined community.
My third question concerns the patterns of political expression involved in the
"new second step. How did American young people communicate their political
opinions using social media during the 2008 campaign and in what ways did their use
of tools like those afforded by Facebook exemplify new and potentially important
modes of influencing their peers? In order to answer this last, most central question, I
conducted interviews with young Obama volunteers in New Hampshire during the
last week of the campaign. In Chapter 3, I describe the methodology I employed to
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conduct this research (while also volunteering with the campaign myself) and explore
the three significant groups of ideas that emerged from my interviews. From this
research, I conclude that supporters use social media to influence their peers because
Facebook's tools make it easy to express political ideas in ways that are subject to
little social friction. Almost all of the young people I interviewed told me that their
Facebook profiles reflect their political beliefs, but more importantly, they viewed
Facebook as a semi-public space that was socially and culturally hospitable to casual
political expression. They felt that messages like "Violet is hopeful for change" were
endemic to their social mediascape. I believe messages like this say more about the




Abraham Lincoln's political career began in Illinois state politics. Both he and
Barack Obama have this in common, in addition to their Harvard educations and
shared interest in constitutional law. But there is another, more immediately relevant
dimension of similarity between Lincoln and Obama: not only did they take the same
route to the national political stage, they did so using variations of the same strategy.
While serving in the state legislature as leader of the Whig Party in 1840, Lincoln
penned the 19th century equivalent of a campaign brief detailing a communications
plan. He was particularly emphatic on one point: "Keep a constant watch on the
doubtful voters, and from time to time have them talked to by those in whom they
have the most confidence" (Tarbell, 1998:164).
By insisting that the Whig campaign to elect William Henry Harrison make a
"constant" effort to maintain direct communication with the swing voters they needed
to persuade, Lincoln pioneered what would become a strategic pillar of many
successful modern campaigns. One of the most effective practitioners of the frequent
talking technique is former Republican strategist Karl Rove. In a 2007 interview with
The Washington Post, Rove actually described the debt he owed Lincoln, no doubt in
an effort to frame his work on behalf of President Bush in a grander context than that
afforded by the various scandals that had attracted the media's attention by that time
(Gerson, 2007). Rove's 2000 Primary and Presidential campaigns exhibited a rare
mastery of the talking "from time to time" strategy; sympathetic, but potentially
doubtful Republican voters were, in fact, talked to relentlessly.
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Rove's first foray into national politics came in 1992, when he was a direct-
mail consultant for George H. W. Bush's reelection effort in Texas. His firm Karl
Rove & Co. was one of two spending the Bush campaign's million-dollar Texas
direct-mail budget in that race and he applied what he believed to be the salient lesson
from Bill Clinton's electoral victory, namely that too little talking (or mailing) had
been done (Moore, 2004:275). He remained determined to avoid committing this
error of taciturnity when he took on the role as George W. Bush's chief strategist.
Bush outspent Gore by a wide margin in 2000 and Rove devoted a significant portion
of the Republican war chest to direct mailing and other voter contact techniques
(Green, 2004). Beginning even in advance of the hard-fought Primary, the Bush
campaign, with Rove at the helm, compiled extensive contact lists and budgeted the
most money for canvassing, calling, and mailing of any previous national campaign
(Birnbaum, 1999).
The political commonalities shared by Obama and Lincoln should be easy for
any student of Presidential history to identify—they are many and manifold, running
from geography to rhetoric. Those shared by Obama and Rove, however, are tougher
to spot, obscured as they are by an ocean of political and ideological disparity. (Of
course, they also had very different job descriptions.) But by "charting the space
between them—and, more importantly, the broader social, cultural, and technological
shifts that have taken place between 2000 and 2008—it is possible to better
understand some of the contexts informing the Obama campaign's communications
strategy. Rove knew how and when to contact specific voters. He knew how to
leverage the organizational advantage he had over opponents by putting either a
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mailer or a volunteer at voters' doors with unprecedented frequency and strategic
precision. Rove's campaign, however, lacked the Obama campaign's message-
shaping prowess; he lacked the rhetorical innovation and sophistication I will discuss
further in my second chapter. His job was to manage his candidate's relationship
with voters in structural terms—put simply, he was a medium man. As such, his work
presents the opportunity to compare in structural terms the communications strategies
deployed by the winning Presidential campaign in 2008 with those of the campaign
that won eight years earlier.
In the context of his innovative efforts to target specific social groups with
direct mail campaigns, Rove's tactics begin to seem remarkably similar to the ways in
which the Obama campaign worked to promote the social mobility of their messages.
Obama' s was an even more formidable system. Like Rove and Lincoln, the Obama
campaign made direct communicative connections with specific voters frequently and
strategically. What was new about the Obama campaign, however, was the scale of its
efforts to communicate using new media. They knocked on doors and sent direct
mail, but they also used social media utilities like Facebook and Twitter, a 13-
million-voter email distribution list, and SMS messaging (Delaney, 2009). These new
media may have been attractive to the campaign because of their potential to help
better execute the very old 'frequent talking' strategy, but they also made a whole
new structure of relationships between candidates and voters possible.
On August 23rd, 2008, the Obama campaign sent the following text message
to 2.9 million people: "Barack has chosen Senator Joe Biden to be our VP nominee.
Watch the first Obama-Biden rally live at 3pm ET on www.BarackObama.com.
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Spread the word!" The people who received this message were supporters who had
responded to an email in which they were invited to sign up to "be the first to know"
who Obama's Vice Presidential nominee would be (Puzzanghera, 2008). It is
significant that the campaign delivered a message in which their candidate is referred
to by his first name and the recipient is colloquially instructed to "spread the word"—
this message provides clear examples of the rhetorical strategy I will discuss in the
next chapter—but what is more significant is that the campaign was able to get this
message into almost 3 million American pockets. This is just one example of the
myriad ways the Obama campaign leveraged new communications technology to
establish new modes of contact between its candidate and his supporters. The appeal
of these media to a campaign is obvious: more talking happening in more intimate
ways. This chapter analyzes what the campaign did in the context of previous
comparable campaigns and ongoing technological trends. Starting with George
Bush's 2000 Presidential campaign and continuing through Howard Dean's 2004
Democratic Primary bid, I will explore the parallel evolutions of political
communications and online campaigning in the period between the internet's
emergence as an important medium for political messages and the 2008 Presidential
campaign. I argue that these contexts reveal the Obama campaign's historical moment
to have been contemporaneous with the political ascendance of social media.
Casting Narrowly
For every new communications medium there is a political campaign that
discovers and ultimately defines its use as a tool of political persuasion. One might
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even argue that the first campaign to fully exploit the potential of a new medium
defines its political use to some extent because it is at this stage when the medium
offers the greatest potential advantage over an opponent that has yet to fully leverage
it. Roosevelt's mastery of the microphone and Kennedy's televisual charisma are easy
(if not entirely conclusive) examples of this dynamic. Rove's direct mail campaigns
in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential races can hardly be considered the first successful
application of Gutenberg's press, but there is a case to be made that the technology on
which Rove's success rested was not the printed word, but database software. In a
2003 New Yorker profile, Nicholas Lemann, the current dean of the Columbia
University Graduate School of Journalism, cites the importance of a then-new
technology that has still received very little scholarly attention: Extensible Markup
Language (XML). He writes that this data coding protocol "made it possible for
political organizations to have much richer information about individual voters"
(2003:79). XML is significant because of the specificity with which it enabled
political campaigns to target the doubtful voters and deliver messages from people in
whom they have confidence.
Lemann (2003) argues that one of the lessons Rove took from the Bush
campaign's narrow win in 2000 was that campaigns "should pay less attention to
consultants, television advertising, polls, and 'message,' and more attention to the
old-fashioned side of the business: registering voters, organizing volunteers, making
face-to-face contact during the last days of a campaign, and getting people to the polls
on Election Day" (2003:79). This lesson gave rise to the vaunted turnout strategy the
Bush campaign deployed in 2004, a strategy which resulted in a 20% increase in the
14
number of voters contacted directly between 2000 and 2004 (Bergan et al.,
2005:764). In the intervening years, Rove had launched a research campaign called
the 72-Hour Task Force, which sought to improve turnout among supporters by
refining the campaign's one-to-one communications strategy. The reason for this
surge in emphasis on traditional canvassing and phone-banking techniques in what is
now thought to have been the heyday of mass communication politics is that the most
astute practitioners of 21st-century electioneering (a category to which Rove certainly
belongs) understood at this time that a structural shift was underway that was already
diminishing the persuasive power of messages delivered via broadcast media.
One of Lemann's (2003) most revealing quotes from Rove illustrates that,
while most casual observers believed that the Bush campaign's use of television
advertising (particularly ad-hominem attack ads, a genre near its apotheosis at the
time), was effective, the strategist himself was losing faith in the medium. Describing
what he believed to be the political saturation of the television, Rove said: "I can
remember focus groups in 2000 where you thought you had a room full of directors.
People were talking about the production values of the spot" (Lemann, 2003:78).
Seemingly almost anticipating the political use of the social media utility, Facebook,
that Mark Zuckerburg would invent the following year, Lemann interprets this quote
as recognition of a broader trend: "In politics now, everybody is trying to figure out
twenty-first-century means of achieving the 19th century goal of establishing face-to-
face relationships between political parties and voters" (2003:79).
Rove saw a decline in the utility (or at least marginal utility) of broadcast
media and set about discovering new ways to apply technology like XML databases
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to cast more narrowly. In 2004, many of his efforts to target specific interest groups
with custom-tailored messages were successful, as evidenced by Bush's gains among
conservative Catholics in Ohio (Jenkins, 2005:91). But as successful as he was in
discovering the advantages of casting narrowly, Rove was less successful at building
a new structure of relationship between his campaign and American voters; what he
achieved was a sophisticated information system. Lemann writes that at this time "in
Rove's shop in the White House... the air [was] thick with buzzwords like 'niche
marketing,' 'micro-modelling,' 'targeting,' and 'granular information'" (2003:80).
The nineteenth-century goal, articulated by one of the most successful nineteenth-
century presidents, would be achieved in new twenty-first-century ways best by
Lincoln's fellow Illinoisan and perhaps first by Howard Dean.
Between Rove's first Presidential campaign for George W. Bush and Obama's
victory in the 2008 Democratic Presidential Primary, significant social, cultural, and
technological shifts took place in America that changed the ways campaigns
communicate. In order to understand these shifts and their implications for the future
of political communication, it is useful to reflect on the contexts that inform the rise
of internet campaigning. Rove saw the potential of casting his message narrowly,
strategically and in ways that could catalyze support within relatively unified social
groups, like conservative Catholics in Ohio. 2004 Democratic Presidential Primary
candidate Howard Dean was the first American politician to (almost) capitalize on the
potential of the internet. Both offer insights into what is new and significant about the
Obama campaign because both contributed to the fundamental changes in the
communicative relationships between American voters and politicians we observed in
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2008. These relationships became intimate and characterized by more one-to-one
communication. Both, therefore, campaigned in ways that set new precedents and
exposed new opportunities for the Obama campaign.
The First Internet Campaign
With the advent of broadcasting, information could be transmitted everywhere
instantly. Incremental changes followed, but the tectonic shift was that which reduced
the marginal cost of each new recipient of a given message within a given space to
zero. It was a shift so pervasive that every assumption about how people
communicated needed to be re-examined. Then, after the internet arrived in the mid-
1990s, it was as though media critics and communications theorists had been
expecting a second coming. Hyperbolic language came to dominate the discourse—a
technological revolution was heralded, one akin to that which took place in the 1920' s
with the arrival of broadcasting. Wired editor Chris Anderson (2006) wrote a more
nuanced account of the changing media economy in his famous 2004 essay, "The
Long Tail," which later became a book by the same name. His idea was that big
would simply be forced to compete with small; he argued that the share of the world's
collective attention devoted to mass media would be diminished by the sheer volume
of niche media produced for (and by) individuals with shared interests. This is a
significant change, to be sure, but it is not a revolution. Revolutions change
everything irreversibly and the arrival of the internet did not quite change
everything—Nielsen Media reports that a quarter of a million American households
watched Obama's Democratic National Convention speech accepting his party's
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nomination on television in August, 2008. What the internet had by this time done
was lead some people, including some campaign managers, to believe that everything
was about to change.
The title of Joe Trippi's 2005 book about internet campaigning is The
Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, the Internet, and the Overthrow of
Everything. He is one such believer. Trippi was a high-ranking staffer with the Dean
campaign; he is credited with developing the internet communications strategy that
enabled much of Dean's early success in the 2004 Democratic Primary. Other
prophets of the decline and fall of broadcasting, like David Weinberger (one of the
authors of The Cluetrain Manifesto (2000), a book, website and wiki that claimed to
describe how the changing media landscape would effect marketers), also populated
the upper echelons of the campaign (Locke, et. al., 2001). To the great
disappointment of these believers, the Dean team failed to overthrow everything and
television ultimately claimed its retribution for the brief insurrection by relentlessly
airing the now-famous "scream".3 But many of the campaign's tactics were nothing
short of revolutionary and its use of the internet reveals a great deal about how
political communication changed between 2000 and 2008. A large-scale online
fundraising apparatus and a young, passionate group of supporters reaching out with
blogs, viral videos, and email chains were not Obama innovations. Although it's clear
that the Dean internet campaign was not transformative on the same scale as the
Obama campaign, it did pioneer new ways of contacting voters, many of which
Obama used to far greater effect.
3 Dean was filmed on January 19,h, 2004, after losing the Iowa Caucuses awkwardly yelling
the word "yeah." The moment later became viewed as a turning point in the campaign.
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Prior to the Dean campaign, the internet was a place to post campaign
literature and sometimes raise money from tech-sawy coastal elites. During the 2000
Presidential campaign, surveys showed that only 10% of Americans used the internet
as a way to get information about political campaigns and even fewer used it as a tool
for supporting them (Chadwick, 2006:155). Andrew Chadwick describes the 2000
elections as a "transitional stage on the way to something more significant"
(2006:154). And as a measure of significance, he notes that by the end of the 2000
Primaries, Al Gore had raised only $10 million online (Chadwick, 2006:154). If the
success of political campaigns were gauged by fundraising totals rather than by vote
totals, perhaps Dean would qualify as a revolutionary after all—despite having been
written off after successive losses in the first two primaries, he raised more than $40
million, largely on the strength of an unprecedented number of online contributions
(Chadwick, 2006:164). The Dean campaign's fundraising success has been variously
attributed to a groundswell of anti-war sentiment, advances in security for online
transactions, and everything in-between. There were myriad variables, but the real
reason he raised so much more money than his competitors (he beat John Kerry, the
eventual nominee, in every reporting quarter of 2004) is that he was asking for it in
new ways (Chadwick, 2006:165). And asking a lot.
Kelly Nuxoll (2007), the email manager for the Dean campaign, summarized
her communications strategy by describing the rule for fundraising messages: "send
at least three, if not five" (Nuxoll, 2007:195). Nuxoll wrote hundreds of Dean emails;
she tells the story of her experience as though the campaign had its own voice and it
was an important part of her job to ensure that all of her emails used it. The
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campaign established conventions that governed the tone, style, and structure of all
the campaign's email communications: "never say 'our' campaign; say 'your'
campaign," write with "a real human voice" (Nuxoll, 2007:194). These rules are
designed to make political rhetoric personal and they sound like they could have been
drawn from the Obama campaign playbook. Messages encoded with this colloquial,
informal style—a tone and voice that says "you, me, Howard (or Barack), and all our
friends, we're on the same team"—are, for obvious reasons, most effective when
they're delivered using a one-to-one medium, or at least a medium that approximates
a one-to-one social structure. They work when they show up inside the social and
cultural barriers we put up to corral political discourse. These barriers often follow
the contours of various types of communities, which is one of the reasons Rove's data
strategy was designed to survey the fence lines of target groups.
The Dean campaign's most formidable tool was its email lists. Convio—an
Austin-based technology company that describes itself as an "Internet software and
services company that provides online Constituent Relationship Management
(eCRM) solutions for nonprofit organizations"—claims to have managed an email
distribution list of more than 600,000 subscribers for the Dean campaign. But this
number does not reflect the real number of people Kelly Nuxoll was talking to. The
list was constantly in flux, with people being added and removed daily, and
enthusiastic supporters forwarding or cc-ing messages onward to their peers.
Facebook wasn't launched until a week after Dean lost the New Hampshire primary;
email was the social medium of the moment in 2003. Even in 2008, email remained
the gateway to the rest of the Obama campaign's digital communications and one of
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the best ways of building social momentum. Delany (2009) describes it as persistently
important even in the age of Facebook: "Email was the main tool used to build
relationships with supporters and to raise money... the campaign's (opt-in-only) list
topped 13 million names, to whom were sent some 7000 separate campaign-written
emails totaling roughly one billion actual messages" (2009:8). And those were just
the emails sent by the campaign; email was also "one of the main ways individual
activists spread the word among their own friends and family" (Delaney, 2009:9). By
2004, the best way for political messages to penetrate the complex systems of barriers
and membranes we use to organize the media flows in our lives was for them to be
channeled through our peers.
The Dean campaign did not deploy a cohesive Web 2.0 communications
strategy, but it was innovative in creating new ways for energetic supporters to
influence their peers. By organizing and communicating with supporters using a
decentralized, 'pass it on' social structure and encouraging initiative with 'Meetup'
gatherings organized online, they were able to engender a campaign culture that
supporters felt was more personal and "authentic" (Teachout and Streeter, 2007:25).
This decentralization was both a content strategy and a contact strategy; the
'Deaniacs' found new channels for talking to the electorate and used them to establish
new modes of talking to the electorate. They created a new structure of relationship
between supporters and the campaign by communicating with voters in ways that
made them feel like they were engaged in a shared project with the campaign.
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Variations on 'Yes We Can'4 have always been part of the rhetoric campaigns use to
consolidate support, but this rhetoric is a lot more believable if supporters are
constantly being "talked to" via email and these conversations take place in a tone
and style that resembles a friendly exchange between peers, particularly if both
parties share a goal. They may not have stormed the Bastille, but they certainly
instigated the early skirmishes of the revolution by subverting earlier relationship
structures.
Supporters enjoyed a much more intimate relationship with the Dean
campaign than the supporters of any of the other Primary candidates did, but the
campaign failed to scale beyond regional early-state insurgency status. Dean's
campaign was built for the Democratic Primaries, which are famously a game of
retail politics, grassroots organizing, and mobilizing supporters. Because Dean didn't
win the nomination and the key figures behind his online communications strategy,
like Joe Trippi, never migrated to the Kerry campaign, we are left to speculate as to
how the tactics Dean and Trippi pioneered might have worked in the General
Election. Like Rove's data systems, Dean's email lists were used to organize,
motivate, and mobilize specific groups of likely supporters. What remained untested
in 2004 was the ability of a participatory campaign, one in which supporters feel like
stakeholders, to maintain the passionate engagement of supporters as it grows to the
scale of a general election and the goal shifts toward persuading undecided voters.
Social media makes it easier for passionate supporters, like those who built Dean's
early momentum, to co-create and reproduce a campaign's messages and images in
An Obama-branded trope that first emerged in his concession speech following his loss to
Hillary Clinton in the New Hampshire Primary.
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ways that invite peers who might not be as passionate (or might not otherwise have
cared at all) to become engaged in the campaign. One of the goals of this thesis is to
explore how the Obama campaign—itself at one time an early-state insurgency, albeit
a more successful one—used Facebook to precisely this effect.
Casting Narrowly, Broadened
When comparing the Dean campaign to the Obama campaign, technological
determinism is, as always, a seductively baited snare. Facebook topped 1 million
active users for the first time one month after the 2004 General Election and topped
100 million users for the first time 2 months before the 2008 General Election
(Facebook). A spate of recent sociological studies have shown that use of social
networking sites ranked among the most popular online activities in this period
(Lenhart & Madden, 2007; Pempek et al., 2009). And between 2004 and 2008, voter
turnout among Americans aged 18 to 29 increased by about 10% (CIRCLE, 2009).
Then there's the money. Obama raised $750 million to finance his win in 2008, which
dwarfs the $370 million incumbent George W. Bush raised in 2004. What's more
significant is that 88% ofthat total came from individual donors, compared with only
74% of Bush's total (OpenSecrets, 2009). Official Federal Election Commission data
do not include the medium through which donations were made, but Members of
Triple O, Obama' s online fundraising operation, revealed to the Washington Post that
3 million donors made a total of 6.5 million contributions online adding up to more
than $500 million (Vargas, 2008). Turnout among young people, social media use,
and online fundraising cannot be linked by the interpolation of any one technology,
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but a broader trend does emerge from these and other diverse aspects of the 2008
campaign: a rise in engagement.
Facebook is an efficient facilitator of engagement. In the two chapters that
follow I will explore how social media made it easy for young people to proliferate
messages and images encouraging their peers to become involved with the campaign,
but here I intend only to provide the technological, social and cultural contexts within
which the Obama campaign's successes were achieved. And the 2008 election's
measurable increase in political engagement took place, generally, in the context of
Web 2.0 giving rise to social media and, specifically, in the context of Facebook
emerging as the dominant social media utility (Small, 2008:85). The internet as a
whole played a significant role in this change, with 55% of the American voting age
population getting information about the campaign or participating in the campaign
somehow online (Smith, 2009:3). This figure is unsurprising because, between 2000
and 2008, 20% more Americans got online (Pew Internet and Life Project). The
number of people who used the internet to engage with a campaign or a political
issue, however, is surprising. In 2008, approximately one in five American internet
users actively participated in online political discourse by posting a comment or a
question on a website or using social media to communicate a political message.
Social media were the most frequent venue for online participation and Obama
supporters were 10% more likely to engage online than McCain supporters (Smith,
2009:13).
Young people are the focus of this thesis not only because they voted in
greater numbers than they had in previous elections—this statistic could have
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prompted an investigation of any of the myriad ways the 2008 election garnered more
attention than previous races—but also because they are the most frequent and
committed political Facebook. Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 were more
likely to use the internet to engage politically in general than any other age group, but
they were more than twice as likely to use a social networking site to engage than the
next most likely group, 30-49-year-olds (Smith, 2009:17). There is also considerable
evidence that, throughout the period of the campaign, social mediascapes were
politically charged environments, with more than half of online social network users
expressing themselves politically. And the specific behaviors set out to investigate
were particularly common among young people: 41% discovered which candidate
their friends voted for, 33% posted political content for their friends to see, and 26%
revealed on these sites which Presidential candidate they voted for (Smith, 2009:43). I
will elaborate further on my methodology in Chapter 3, but these statistics illustrate in
part why I chose to study young Obama supporters in my pursuit of a better
understanding of the political use of social media.
It is instructive to situate the ascendance of social media within the context of
Karl Rove's efforts to use data technologies to figure out who best to talk to and Howard
Dean's use of the internet to talk more frequently and more intimately with his supporters
because all three are driven by a shared impulse, one that was articulated in the restrained
language of the 19th century by Lincoln. It is impossible to be certain what he meant by
"doubtful"—perhaps this is a concise way to describe what we now call 'swing voters' or
'late breakers'—but we know, in the very least, that the word "doubtful" is an adjective.
His intent was not to talk to all voters or whichever voters chose to listen; he is describing
a specific group of persuadable people who are neither firm supporters nor decided
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opponents. Neither Rove nor Dean and Trippi sought out the ears of doubtful people; in
fact, both targeted people who were relatively certain about specific things, from the war
in Iraq to a woman's reproductive rights. But both saw the electorate as organized by
social and cultural forces, not by the boundaries of media markets. Both, therefore, saw
the benefit of casting their messages narrowly and both succeeded (on different scales, to
be sure) in building communications strategies that used new media to shape and
accelerate the proliferation of their messages in and through the communities they
targeted. In this context, it is possible to imagine Facebook as being built following the
collapse of the Dean campaign for the purpose of supporting the growth of the next early
state insurgency.
Facebook, of course, wasn't built for this purpose. It was built for college and
university students to curate markers of their identity, from expressions of political
opinions to expressions of appreciation for bands and television shows, and display these
markers in a way that would be visible to their peers. The Facebook group "1 Million
Strong for Barack" may have met and exceeded its membership goal, but this is still for
the most part what the site is used for. Both Rove and Dean talked to certain supporters
frequently in order to build engagement and Dean in particular, with Joe Trippi' s help,
began to discover new ways to exploit a then-nascent Web 2.0 media ecology to talk with
supporters for the same purpose. Neither had the benefit of a medium that would enable
them to talk with voters who might then, depending on the success of the conversation,
integrate the campaign's images and messages into their online identity. Such a medium,
I hypothesize, not only makes engagement easy; it makes engagement social and
communicable. And though it may not be possible to argue that the widespread use of
this technology among American young people explains their greater collective
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participation in the 2008 election, I will argue that it contributed to this shift and that the
ways in which it contributed warrant scholarly attention.
In this chapter I have shown that the Obama campaign benefited from a moment
in the history of social media's political ascendance that created the opportunity to build a
communications strategy that could be propelled by unprecedented social momentum.
Rove's direct mail tactics and techniques for defining and targeting small communities
(geographic and imagined) preceded the Obama campaign's social media strategy by
subverting the primacy of mass media and recognizing that a messaging strategy is
potentially most persuasive when it can penetrate socially-defined community
boundaries. The Dean campaign's innovations then went further, using the internet to
turn the campaign into its own community or network of communities. His was the first
campaign to exploit Web 2.0, thereby decentralizing control of parts of its
communications strategy, and it even used elements of the rhetorical system I will
describe in Chapter 2. Perhaps the country wasn't quite ripe for Dean's brand of change
or perhaps the candidate was not personally charismatic enough to build the social
momentum Obama enjoyed. I believe it's most likely that neither condition existed in
2004, but also that Obama's successes cannot be explained simply as a function of
intersecting social, cultural and technological trends or his personal charisma. His
communications strategy relied on particular tactics that leveraged both these trends and
his charisma to harness the social momentum he enjoyed.
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Chapter 2: The Rhetoric of the First Socially Mediated
Campaign
All politics is personal. If Tip O 'Neil, the late Congressman whose insights
remain the stuff of Democratic Party orthodoxy, had survived to witness the arrival of
the first national internet campaign, that's what his famous maxim would have been.
It's not that politics is any less local than it was in the 1930s when he first learned this
lesson—quite the opposite, actually: the American political landscape is now in some
ways more like it was then than at any other time since. It was in the 1930s that the
last paradigm-shifting communications technology transformed the dominant social
structure of political communications. Television, while certainly a transformational
technology, distributes messages according to the same structural model
(broadcasting) that radio introduced. (Or at least it did until recently.) When
Roosevelt addressed the nation with his first Fireside Chat, he ushered in an era in
which the dominant mode of talking to Americans involved creating a single message
and transmitting it through the air so as to reach as many people simultaneously as
possible. This created a social structure of communication according to which politics
remained qualitatively less "local" local than they were prior to rise of mass media.
But the basic concept of "local" politics has recently been making a dramatic
comeback. O'Neil was talking about the persistent value of traditional "shoe leather"
retail politics, but he could have been talking about how politicians turn mass
campaigns with minimal effects into grassroots campaigns with significant effects.
He could have been talking about the Obama campaign.
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What local politics meant in 1932 was campaigning on a social and cultural
scale that let political communicators circulate messages within a single interpretive
community. This has always been an effective way of campaigning, but it's costly
and time-consuming. Broadcasting was simply much more cost-effective and
efficient. But the opposite is now true. Social media utilities like Facebook create
channels and venues for a social referencing process that make virtual local
campaigning cheap and efficient. Messages from campaigns that penetrate online
interpretive communities like Facebook can travel within them broadly, instantly and
with almost no cost. The advantage of local campaigning—shoe leather politics,
marathon grip-and-grin sessions, assembly line baby-kissing—is authenticity. It's
about the projection of empathy and the claiming of 'one of us' status. And it worked
because politicians who (physically) got inside voters' communities had a far better
shot at penetrating their defensive cynicism and mistrust than those who did not.
What is different now is that these communities are online.
The traditional concept of local campaigning's value and merit still informs
the strategies of successful politicians. Door-to-door canvassing, for instance, remains
the most effective method (on a per-contact basis) for promoting turnout among
sympathetic voters, according to a comprehensive series of field experiments by Yale
political scientists Alan Gerber and Donald Green (2001:26) testing different
techniques during real elections. But authenticity, the prize for which politicians
campaign locally, can now increasingly be won by campaigning personally, virtually.
This is the value of the efficient, transparent and public social-referencing process
that Facebook provides. In this chapter I will argue that when a campaign's messages
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are inserted into a mediascape where they can be rapidly proliferated via their
endorsement (and, by extension, co-production) by supporters, authenticity and
credibility may be rapidly accumulated. Of course, by campaigning 'personally' I
don't mean campaigning for and by oneself. I mean two things: first, that the Obama
campaign successfully employed the syntax and rhetoric of interpersonal
communication and, second, that the campaign's communications strategy
exemplified the successful penetration of newly personalized mediascapes.
In my first chapter I described the cultural and technological contexts that
informed and gave rise to the Obama campaign's communications successes. In this
chapter I intend to focus more specifically on the attributes of the campaign's
messaging strategy that I argue enabled these successes. My third chapter is
concerned primarily with the results of the field research I conducted while
campaigning in New Hampshire, but it is useful here to mention one compelling
discovery that emerged from my interviews: Obama supporters usually described a
significant degree of exposure to campaign messaging that was mediated and re-
produced by—or co-produced with—their peers. When I asked them what kinds of
things they were seeing or hearing about the campaign, they frequently described
materials to which they had become exposed via online social-referencing processes.
They were receiving the campaign's messages from the campaign, but frequently also
from the campaign via their friends. These messages included everything from a
forwarded YouTube clip to an image on a Facebook profile "wall," but it all
circulated within online personal communicative ecosystems. It's all part of the new
personal-virtual local.
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Volunteers also described surprisingly frequent contact with the campaign and
a relationship with the campaign (extending to the candidate himself) that was
intensely personal in character. The combination of this personal relationship with the
campaign and the rapid, fluid social referencing processes made possible by utilities
like Facebook created feedback dynamics whereby the co-production of some
messages by supporters lent the messages produced and disseminated entirely by the
campaign a personal character they would not otherwise have had. A Facebook
message from the campaign feels more personal, I argue, to someone who is also
receiving similar messages from the campaign via their peers. But the only practical
way to understand how these messaging strategies function is to first examine the
specific direct messaging tactics the campaign employed, then consider how the
messages circulate socially. These are the two steps that constitute the model I
propose for explaining the persuasive force (or flow) of the Obama's campaign's
messaging strategy: Step 1, the deployment of a rhetoric that facilitates an imagined
personal relationship with the candidate^ thereby promoting engagement and, Step 2,
the co-production, socially mediated reception, and social proliferation of the
campaign's messages.
The first step seems obvious, given the campaign's success, but is nonetheless
worth examining with the aid of a more robust analytical toolkit than that which has
(so far) been applied. Writing in The New York Times Magazine in the weeks before
Obama's inauguration, Matt Bai (2009) noted a study by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project showing that "more than half of Obama's online supporters
expect to hear directly from the president or his administration in the months ahead,
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and 62 percent of Obama voters expect that they will urge other people to support his
policies" (48). He went on to argue that these data are indicative of an "intimacy
between president and voter that surpasses anything born of the broadcast age" (48).
Bai is one of many commentators to notice that the relationship between Obama and
those supporters with whom he communicates online is a new phenomenon, but there
remains a conspicuous dearth of understanding when it comes to how these
relationships actually work or how they were formed in the first place.
I think the answers to the questions that persist into the first term of the
Obama administration can be found at the intersection of classical rhetorical theory
and ongoing discourses in communication theory. The first question is how did they
so pervasively traverse our ever-more-effectively mediated, moderated, edited and
curated personal mediascapes that the supporters I interviewed were finding
campaign messaging on their peers' Facebook news feeds and tweet-streams
everywhere they turned? This, I believe, was achieved through the campaign's use of
the oldest trick in the political rhetoric book—the book, naturally, being Aristotle's
Rhetoric. The campaign's messages traveled across social mediascapes and between
potential supporters with unprecedented velocity and fluidity because, I argue, they
were constructed with an ethos-driven rhetorical style.
The second area of inquiry I intend to explore (Step 2) is how these campaign
messages circulated and proliferated within and between supporters' personal
mediascapes. I will argue that the rhetoric with which the individual messages were
constructed not only promoted their penetration, but enabled the further infusion of
authenticity provided by a synthetic co-creation process mirroring that which Elihu
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Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld observed in their seminal 1955 work, Personal Influence.
Katz and Lazarsfeld's two-step flow of communication—the notion that media
messages are filtered through social reference processes, colloquially (if reductively)
called the water cooler effect—lost credibility when the minimal effects hypothesis
that accompanied it gave way to the mass effects of mass communication theory
(Bennett and Iyengar, 2008:4). The fragmentation of mass media, however, has more
recently resulted in a fragmentation of mass communication theory, leaving elements
of Katz and Lazarsfeld's 1955 work more relevant than they have been in a
generation.
Drawing on the masterfully disruptive recent work of W. Lance Bennett and
Shanto Iyengar (2008), I argue that the notion of messages gaining mobility,
credibility, authenticity, and (notably) "influence" through a social reference process
deserve resurrection. In fact, I believe the complex and sophisticated social reference
processes engendered by social media like Facebook may now be a greater force for
organizing influence (albeit in a typically internet-age chaotic and asymmetrical
fashion) than their 1940s equivalents were among Katz and Lazarsfeld's Decatur,
Illinois, test group. Arguments such as those advanced by Todd Gitlin in his 1978
critique of Personal Influence focus on the disintegration of the institutions of social
organization that served as the apparatus of social reference in pre-mass media
America and assert that mass effects have supplanted minimal effects as a result of
this disintegration. But political communication, in the era of mass media
fragmentation and selective consumption, is increasingly subject to what even Gitlin
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(1978) would now have to recognize as diminishing effects (Bennett and Iyengar,
2008:10).
So the prevailing argument critiquing the prevailing critique of Katz and
Lazarsfeld's (1955) two-step flow of communication relies on the assertion that mass
effects have declined with the decline of mass media. The result must therefore be a
return to messages achieving little effect on there own, or at least little effect after
only one step. Now, however, this assertion appears to be met with at least one
obvious contradiction: the Obama campaign's messaging strategy was not met with
minimal effects. There's little evidence that he persuaded large numbers of
Republicans to vote Democratic, but he did persuade large numbers of typically
apathetic young people to vote. Under-25 turnout to the traditionally retiree-saturated
Iowa caucuses soared 135% in 2008, and that's after Dean's youth-focused, campus-
driven 2004 campaign (Von Drehle, 2008). And in the 2008 general, turnout among
Americans aged 18 to 29 increased by about 10% over 2004 (CIRCLE, 2009).
Obama' s ethos-driven rhetoric is part of a political messaging strategy that
operates according to a two-step model. As with the model Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955) envisioned, the success of the second step depends on the success of the first. I
will therefore begin by examining how his messages achieved the first step—
penetrating a potential supporter's membrane of selective exposure, persuading him
or her to opt-in to the campaign's communication regime;—and then explore how their
effects were multiplied and amplified by processes of social reference and social
creation. Messages that inhabit a supporter's personalized communicative ecosystem
proliferate, providing both social references for the broader campaign while also
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gaining credibility and authenticity. In this chapter I will explore how messages and
messaging strategies that function (and flow) in this way can be systemically
constructed and deployed, but also consider ways in which the success of the Obama
campaign's tactics might reflect the emergence of broader issues for the future of
political communication.
The First Step
Aristotle wrote of ethos, the first of his three modes of persuasion, that "we
believe good men more fully and more readily than others" (2004:7). This, while
certainly true, is limited in its instructive value—it amounts to 'be good and you'll be
persuasive.' He does, however, offer another more helpful description of ethos as
rhetorical mode: "persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible" (2004:7). This might seem so
intuitive as to lack any applicable insight. Until the implications of the link between
credibility and character are considered, that is. Aristotle is saying, first, that it is
possible to deliver "speech. . . so spoken as to make us think [a skilled rhetorician]
credible" and, second, that so speaking informs the impression of the rhetorician's
character held by his or her audience. (2004:7). This is not a trivial claim. Aristotle
reinforces it, adding: "this is true generally, whatever the question is, and absolutely
true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided"5 (2004:7). His
point is not simply that a rhetorical strategy focused on describing positive attributes
of the speaker's character might be effective, but that speech can be performed in
5 Book I, Chapter II; retrieved March 20, 2009, from public.iastate.edu.
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such a way as to emphasize the speaker's character and that speech so encoded can be
intrinsically persuasive.
Ethos and Modern Political Rhetoric
Due to the fragmentation of mass-media, new technologies enabling ever-
more sophisticated selective consumption, and the mass personalization of online
mediascapes, American opinions have scattered and diverged since the height of
broadcasting. Opinions are certainly divided. And few could argue that Obama's
March 18, 2008, race speech (titled "A More Perfect Union") was not 'spoken as to
make us think him credible' (Bobo and Dawson, 2009:9). Obama's rhetoric in this
speech as in others was engineered in exactly the way Aristotle describes ethos:
persuasion achieved by character achieved by credibility. The sequence, in Obama's
case, functions as follows: first enough credibility had to be established so that his
campaign could rest significantly on his personal traits, then a messaging strategy had
to be constructed that would engender and reinforce an imagined personal
communicative relationship between the candidate and his supporters. David Gliem
and James Janack (2008) examined BarackObama.com in 2008 and found significant
continuity between the text and images on the site and the rhetoric of his speeches,
concluding that the two were coordinated in order to reinforce the perception that
Obama was a "transformational leader" like Martin Luther King, Jr. and John F.
Kennedy. This was among the most transparently ethos-driven tactics the campaign
deployed, since the goal is to simply draw credibility form other credible figures.
Because there exists both an exhaustive body of literature discussing strategies for
shaping affect generally in political communication—consider Marcus Cicero's
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famous maxim, "the effect is in the affect"—and considerable scholarly discourse
(Frank and McPhail; Gliem and Janack, 2008) concerning Obama's particular affect,
I will focus primarily on the specific rhetorical attributes of the campaign's messages
that reflect an ethos-driven strategy. Briefly, however, it is worth mentioning that his
affect (generally) was effective.
Obama rallies were emotion-saturated events. This fact is best evidenced by
searching YouTube for coverage of events like his Iowa victory speech (or even his
subsequent New Hampshire concession speech). 'Man on the street' interviews
showed some supporters giddy with excitement and others with tears streaming down
their faces. Every politician aspires to be able to reach these oratorical heights of
passion because energized supporters are influential supporters, but it's also
important to note that emotions, generally, play a significant role in the way
Americans make voting decisions. Drew Westen (2007) posits in The Political Brain
that, "although both have an impact, gut level feelings (? like this guy' / ? don't like
this guy') are about three times as powerful as more 'rationally' derived preferences
in predicting electoral choices" (2007:120). On July 24, 2008, Obama gave a well-
received speech at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. Given that the primary alternative to
ethos according to Aristotle's formulation is logos, the 'what I can do for you'
strategy, the German speech demonstrates something interesting about Obama's
rhetoric. There was very little he could have done for his German audience, but my
own YouTube viewing of the scene in Berlin suggests to me that they were energized.
And logos does not easily energize non-constituents. Of course, many Americans
were even more energized—one of the questions I asked Obama supporters in New
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Hampshire was "why come out this time?" and most respondents couched their
answers in the personal attributes of the candidate.
Arguing that political theorists should devote more attention to understanding
ethos in a contemporary context, Simone Chambers (2009) notes that "[ethos] leaves
much to the serendipitous appearance of certain individuals" (339). Expressing
concern about the persuasive power of ethos-driven communications strategies, she
goes on to argue that "interest in character can turn into an obsession with image and
images can be packaged like commodities" (340). In the specific context of Obama,
she shares this concern with many of his critics, but obsession with his image is not at
issue here—the efficacy of ethos is. Because ethos is potentially three times more
powerful than its logic-based sibling, politicians like Obama who can serendipitously
appear and evoke ? like this guy' sentiments without muddying themselves with
policy prescriptions, are well advised to leave their political identities loosely defined.
Ellen McGirt (2008), writing in the Silicon Valley business magazine Fast Company
during the primary season, may have been the first to articulate the way in which
Obama's style made his communications strategy better able to live and proliferate
online than that of his rivals. She pointed out that Obama's campaign (or branding
strategy, as she saw it) was uniquely well suited to the diffusion of control and
flattening of hierarchy that accompanies social media communications. "Traditional
top-down messages don't often work in a system where the masses are in charge.
Marketers must cede a certain degree of control over their brands. Yet giving up
control online, in the right way, unleashes its own power... Obama has tapped into
that power" (McGirt, 2008:87).
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Obama ceded control of his brand to his supporters by encouraging them to
participate in his messaging strategy. The nature of this participation ranges from
semi-professional user-generated content, like the "Obama Girl" and "Yes We Can"
videos, and the use of tools like My.BarackObama.com that enabled supporters to
make canvassing calls for the campaign to entirely independent grassroots
movements. This kind of relationship between the campaign and its grassroots is
made possible by the candidate's rhetorical success in building a brand that
supporters want to own. Obama' s Super Tuesday victory speech, for instance, a
classically eloquent example of traditional political stagecraft, became one of the
most viewed videos on the internet the week it was delivered (Kellner, 2009:718).
Douglas Kellner (2009) points out that, following the officially sanctioned videos and
the freelance efforts "Obama Girl" and "Yes We Can," "there emerged grassroots-
based videos made by ordinary people who produced their own videos and narratives
to support Obama" (719). The supporters that made these videos used them as a
"platform for grassroots political mobilization with which to inspire and consolidate
potential Obama supporters online and off-line" (Kellner, 2009: 719). Ben Boer
(2009), a former Vice President of Technology for educational software company
AHA! Interactive and an Obama consultant, described this structure according to
which content was inspired by the campaign but produced by supporters that appears
alongside content produced by the campaigns itself as an "open source" movement
Both the "Obama Girl" and "Yes We Can" videos were semi-professionally produced viral
videos not explicitly sanctioned by the campaign, but nonetheless widely circulated with tacit
approval. Obama Girl's videos (obamagirl.com) showed an attractive woman singing "I've
got a crush on Obama," while "Yes We Can"
(my.barackobama.com/page/invite/yeswecanvideo) also a music video, was a mashup
featuring celebrities like musician will.i.am singing lines from Obama's speeches over music.
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(Boer, 2009:38). But for the purpose of understanding how Obama's rhetorical
strategy worked, the significance of this flattened communications structure is that a
broad range of messages must fit within the overall messaging campaign. Obama's
rhetoric accommodates a wide array of different messages from different sources
because the unifying force is Obama himself. With a surplus of positive affect to
spread around, the campaign did exactly that.
An ethos-driven rhetorical strategy is one that supports messaging
promiscuity. This was desirable partially because the people to whom the campaign
ceded control of Obama's brand were his supporters and doing so gave them a sense
of equity in the campaign—co-producers are stakeholders. But it's also useful
because it's easier to build a movement around supporters' faith in the "personal
character" of the candidate than around any one idea or collection of ideas. Drawing
on data from their 1996 study polling voters on their emotional response to then-
candidates Bill Clinton and Bob Dole, Just et al. (2007) argue that "hope is a
powerful coping mechanism that can mould perceptions about candidates and bias
information search" (2007:231). A candidate who can inspire hope and persuade
people to invest that hope in his or her personal character can build broad coalitions,
crossing otherwise treacherous boundaries like party (and policy).
The Syntax ofSolidarity
Once Obama supporters had invested their hopes in the candidate and his
credibility, gaining a sense of equity in the campaign, they could be further
galvanized, energized, and mobilized by rhetorical tactics that emphasized shared
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participation in a common mission. These tactics employ the syntax of "We," a
simple conjugative maneuver that transforms a sermon into a rally and a fundraising
email into a call for collective action. This syntax was deployed persistently and
pervasively across every medium and every message. It was maintained assiduously
by campaign representatives ranging from campaign manager David Plouffe to local
precinct captains. Not only does this continuity spread Obama's golden affect around
to areas of the campaign he never touched, it spreads the suggestion of a personal
relationship with the candidate to areas of the messaging strategy that would
otherwise feel like traditionally top-down, one-way communication. It lends ethos
and a sense of shared participation in the movement to even the most mundane
communications.
In his definitive work on the nexus of language, commerce, and politics,
Norman Fairclough (1989) termed this tactic "synthetic personalization." And he was
mostly cynical about its use. "Synthetic personalization stimulates solidarity: it seems
that the more 'mass' the media become, and therefore the less in touch with
individuals or particular groupings in their audiences, the more media workers and
'personalities' (including politicians) purport to relate to members of their audience
as individuals who share large areas of common ground" (Fairclough, 1989:195).
Writing in the context of Thatcher's England, a political climate he abhorred,
Fairclough saw this as an insidiously powerful and persuasive feature of what he
assumed to be an increasingly mass communication. The effects (mass effects) he
presupposed were the further reduction of public discourse to a unidirectional flow
with citizens acting only as passive consumers.
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It's impossible to determine the relative weight of the two obvious reasons
Fairclough could not have anticipated Obama—he was writing at the apex of the
broadcast era and under the rule of the Iron Lady—but the communicative
relationship he envisions, whether insidious or not, would seem unfamiliar to Obama
supporters. "Thatcher... builds a relationship with the 'public' based in part upon
synthetic personalization... and constructs 'the public' as a community of political
consumption, which real people are induced to join" (Fairclough, 1989:197). Right or
wrong, if Fairclough' s concept of synthetic personalization were applied to them,
they'd object to the characterization of their community as one in which only
consumption is shared. More importantly, though, they'd object to the way it
characterizes their relationship with the candidate. He wrote that "party politics, in
becoming increasingly conducted through one-way public discourse in the media,
with advertising as its model, is increasingly retreating from two-way, face-to face
discourse" (Fairclough, 1989:211). But Obama supporters don't feel that their
relationship with the campaign is like that which exists between an advertiser and
consumer.
Future marketers would do well to take note of why not, because most
supporters did not necessarily interact with the campaign in a way that would not be
possible for Coke, Nike or Apple if a savvy enough social media strategy were to be
applied. George Christodoulides writes that "post-internet branding is about
facilitating conversations around the brand. Consumers are now wired and capitalize
on social networks to derive power from one another" (Christodoulides, 2009:142).
He was referring to recent evolutions in marketing theory, but he could easily have
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been talking about the model for building political brands pioneered by Obama. The
important thing isn't how the relationship was constructed, it's whether or not
supporters feel the sense that they're part of the way the brand's image is shaped.
Fairclough (1989) argues that "people's involvement in politics is less and less as
citizens, and more and more as consumers; their bases of participation are less and
less the real communities they belong to, and more and more the political equivalents
of consumption communities, which political leaders construct for them" (1989:211).
But Christodoulides (2009) also describes socially-mediated evolutions in the
communitarian ways we consume: "the internet enables consumers to... satisfy their
social needs through sharing of consumption-related experiences" (2009:142). And if
the bases of participation from which supporters engage with the campaign are real
communities, they participate more as citizens. Facebook communities could, from a
certain perspective, be perceived as consumption communities, but the politicians
didn't construct them; they happened organically and the politicians had to learn how
to infiltrate them.
Obama's successful use of synthetic personalization as a tactic was made
possible by his ethos-driven rhetorical style, but it also contributed to the shaping of
that style. The emotional engagement his supporters felt with the campaign and the
candidate himself (by virtue of his "personal character") when they attended or
watched a speech was extended to the campaign's digital messages because the
consistent use of the syntax of solidarity created continuity. Ethos is much more
easily projected in speech, but it's transferable to text when encoded in this syntax.
The use of the first person plural pronoun in a speech promotes inclusion—"speaker
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plus third party plus addressee"—that pretty much every politician knows (Coville,
2008:5). But in an email (figure 1), an SMS message (figure 2), or a tweet (figure 3),
it's 'Barack and me' who are included. Noting that Obama supporters expected to
maintain this communicative relationship even after his inauguration, Matt Bai (2009)
writes that, "to a striking degree, voters seem to feel a personal connection with
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Figure 1: This email was sent on November 3, 2008, from "info@barackobama.com" the address the
campaign attributed to the candidate.
45
,w.£TM'-^.i;..W 7-5? PM ,. ,,..,< ...... : ¿y.. ¦¦;,., S..E3.
?^?
m*H.i.m
Aug 19, 2008 10:Sa AM
%
Welcome to Obama Mobile.
You will now be one of the 1 st
notified when the VP
candidate is selected. Text
HELP for help. Std charges
apply. Please forward.
Aug ?3, 2Û08 3 04 AM
f Barack has chosen Senator ^
Joe Bidën to be our VP
nominee. Watchjhe first
Obama-Biden rally live at ; ¦&)
3pm ??,??
; www.BarackObama.com . ,? Spread the word!
C "N/
Figure 2: This SMS message was sent on August 23, 2008, to
supporters who had previously submitted their cell phone
numbers to the campaign by sending the letters "vp" to the
campaign's code number.
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Figure 3: This Screenshot of @BarackObama's Twitter feed was taken
on November 5, 2008.
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It's an emotional dynamic—the emotions in rallies and speeches permeate the digital
messaging strategy and the sense of intimacy with which the syntax of solidarity
infuses individual messages is reflected back upon the campaign in other dimensions
of its relationship with supporters. Ethos is reinforced by this feedback loop—
supporters' emotional engagement with the campaign motivates them to let the
messages into their personal mediascapes, either by giving the campaign an email
address, following the candidate on twitter, or friending him on Facebook. And,
facilitating the second step through which the campaign's influence flows, their
emotional engagement is also a force adding credibility to the campaign's messages
as they are received by others. "Emotions are contagious," Drew Westen (2007), a
psychologist famous for his studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to demonstrate the role of emotions in political bias, points out. "When we
watch other people do or feel something, neurons become active in the same regions
of our brains as if we were doing or feeling those things for ourselves." This "mirror
neuron" effect is our neurobiology compelling us to feel something like what the
people around us feel (2007:288). And social media lets us have more people around
us than ever before.
The Second Step
His mastery of rhetorical ethos was a big part of why potential supporters let
Obama's political messaging in, but because this tactic extended to the messages
themselves, it was possible for supporters not only to be persuaded by him, but also to
persuade /or him. These were messages that supporters forwarded to peers, posted to
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their Facebook walls or made reference to in status updates. They were not just
designed to be convincing, they were built to travel through and across networked
mediascapes. This is a strategy that achieves mass effects by extending beyond the
shrinking sphere of mass media and one that responds to young Americans' retreat
from the mass into the personal communicative ecosystem of social media. As
Bennett and Iyengar argue (2008), "growing distrust of official communication,
declining confidence in the political leaders who rely on managed public
performances, and the widening disconnect between citizens and government,"
motivates this retreat (2008:10). But it also motivates politicians to follow us into our
personal mediascapes.
The Rise and Fall ofMass Effects
Katz's and Lazarsfeld's idea was based in mid-20,h-century western
assumptions about community. Given the impact ofPersonal Influence (for decades it
bestrode the worlds of marketing, political communications, and communication
theory like a colossus) it's significant to note how narrowly defined the research itself
actually was. Their studies, all conducted in Decatur, Illinois, all proceeded from "the
introduction into an isolated social system of a single artifact—a product, an
'attitude,' an image" (Gitlin, 1978:208). They even offer a footnote acknowledging
that they ignored the advent of television—potentially a more "credible" medium, as
Todd Gitlin (1978) observes—clarifying that "the study was completed before the
general introduction of television" (1978:220-221). For all its influence, Personal
Influence was in decline within little more than a decade of its publishing. Katz and
Lazarsfeld conceptualized the audience as "a tissue of interrelated individuals rather
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than as isolated point-targets in a mass society," so when the mass society became
increasingly mass and the tissue began to disintegrate, the social processing dynamics
they observed were thought to play a diminishing role in communication (Katz and
Lazarsfeld, 2005:72).
In his 2000 book, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam argued that the institutions
of social cohesion, like service clubs or the bowling leagues from which he derives
his title, were dissolving. But with respect to communication theory, his ideas were
more than two decades out of vogue. Gitlin's 1978 critique of Personal Influence
revolved to a significant degree around the idea that the similar social structures Katz
and Lazarsfeld assumed to be stable interpretive communities providing predictable
(or at least measureable) social reference processes were dissolving. In their place, he
found evidence that the first step in the two-step flow was commanding significant
and growing "influence" over the decisions that Americans made with their money
and their votes. He asked (implying both that the question had gone unasked by
earlier theorists and that the answer was changing) "how does the routine reach of
certain hierarchies into millions of living rooms on any given day affect the common
language and concepts and symbols?" (Gitlin, 1978:206).
His answer, paraphrased, was 'with mass and direct effects.' And it's this
answer that invited further discourse and responses, leading ultimately to the
ascendance of new arguments and evidence showing a return to minimal effects
(Bennett and Iyengar, 2008). The scholarly conversation has now circled back around
to 1955, before the full realization of the broadcast era, with new concepts of the
limited persuasive power of mass-mediated messages. These rely heavily on
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structural and technological changes that have fragmented audiences: "In the 1960s,
an advertiser could reach 80 percent of U.S. \yomen with a prime-time spot on the
three networks. Today, it has been estimated that the same spot would have to run on
one hundred TV channels to reach the same number of viewers" (Jenkins, 2006:66).
But such technocentrism neglects to acknowledge the potentially more important
social and cultural shifts inherent to the current trend toward minimal effects. After
all, it wouldn't matter how many channels there were if all American women chose to
watch the same show.
Positing a new phase in the evolution of media effects theory, Bennett and
Iyengar (2008) write that "with the continued detachment of individuals from the
group-based society, and the increased capacity of consumers to choose from a
multitude of media channels (many of which enable user-produced content), the
effects picture may be changing again" (2008:25). They argue that weakening effects
are part of an ongoing cultural shift toward selective exposure. Ours is now a cultural
landscape in which the messages we receive are often the messages to which we
expose ourselves by choice. "As receivers exercise greater choice over both the
content of messages and media sources, effects become increasingly difficult to
produce or measure in the aggregate" (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008:4). Audiences for
political messages are increasingly elusive, not only because Republicans can watch
Fox News and Democrats can watch MSNBC, but also because independents
(especially young independents) can watch neither. If campaigns focus entirely on
traditional media, they are confronted with declining per-message marginal gains in
support and rising per-message costs.
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These trends are accelerating because the internet, with its millions of
microscopic social enclaves enabling rigorous selective exposure, is structurally
predisposed toward minimal effects. "The internet was designed to be decentralized,
meaning that control is distributed to all users who have relatively equal opportunity
to contribute content. . . Audiences are reconceprualized as smaller and discrete 'taste
cultures,' rather than as an amorphous mass" (Chaffee and Metzger, 2001:369-370).
Nicholas Negroponte's concept of the 'Daily Me', a hypothetical custom newspaper
that symbolizes the theory that such extremes of personalization are now possible that
isolation will become an increasingly likely side-effect, anticipated presciently in
1995 the way Americans, and politically engaged Americans more than apathetic
ones, organize and curate their exposure to political messages in 2009. Theorists like
Steven Chaffee and Miriam Metzger, who in 2001 predicted the end of mass
communication, got a lot right about the minimal-effects future they described, but
Obama's campaign disrupts one important corollary of their claim: "New media will
allow people to isolate themselves from the larger public discourse and... the result
may be that the kind of widespread collective action seen in the past may not be
possible in the future" (2001:375). The Obama campaign was nothing if not
widespread collective action.
Mass Minimal Effects
This chapter is about how the Obama campaign's communications strategy,
and the unified rhetorical strategy within it, achieved mass effects within a fractured
mediascape. The campaign's messages were subject to the social reference process
that characterized the two-step flow and its minimal effects, but the social mediation
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of these messages appear (as I will show in chapter 3) to have promoted their flow
rather than inhibited it. Because this strategy was executed on the largest possible
scale, it might plausibly represent a new model for the flow of political messages, one
formed through the synthesis of two very old strategies: the first inspired by Aristotle,
the second by Katz and Lazarsfeld. The first step in this new two-step flow was
achieved by producing ethos-encoded messages that engendered an imagined
personal relationship with a stranger: Barack. Paradoxically, the second step is
achieved through an "impersonal" relationship with friends, or at least with Facebook
friends. "Impersonal influence," according to Diana Mutz (1998), is "not about the
direct persuasive influence of media messages that attempt to promote one viewpoint
over another; it is strictly concerned with the capacity for presentations of collective
opinion or experience to trigger social influence processes" (1998:4). And it explains
part of how the campaign's messages were co-produced and proliferated by Obama's
supporters. Bennett and Iyengar (2008), in turn, explain why: "The kind of
communication that reaches... personalized audiences tends to travel through
multiple channels and may require interactive shaping in order to be credible and
authentic" (2008:18).
This "interactive shaping" is the Facebook-era equivalent of Katz and
Lazarsfeld' s water cooler, and it could potentially command much more influence
than its mid-century predecessor. Interpersonal communication alters opinions,
judgments, and even perceptions by introducing the credibility, authenticity,
proximity of peer-to-peer contact. Mutz (1998) offers the example of crime to
illustrate how this works. People may read about rising crime statistics in a newspaper
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or watch a news report about worsening crime without experiencing significant
effects, but when a peer is victimized by crime and tells them about it, the effects are
likely to be much greater, despite the probability that they will be victimized
themselves remaining the same (Mutz, 1998:67). Communication organized and
mediated by online social networking utilities, though not nearly as intimate as a face-
to-face conversation, makes similar effects possible. If a friend posts "just got
robbed" as a Facebook "status update," their peers will likely feel these greater
effects. The difference is that there are potentially several hundred peers feeling these
effects and, perhaps even more importantly, several hundred people within a single
person's network announcing that they have just been robbed.
This collective influence, the aggregation and social mediation of personal
influence, cannot be directly controlled by a political campaign, but political
campaigns can build messaging strategies that make it easy. In some ways this new
model of the flow of influence resolves the debate over the relative importance of
mass media and personal influence by providing an explanation for how the two are
processed together in a culture where messages must penetrate our cocoons of
selective exposure. As Mutz (1998) puts it, "the question is not whether perceptions
are formed by mass media or by personal experiences or interpersonal exchanges, but
rather how people integrate information that they receive from mass media, from
other people, and from experiences of their own lives" (1998:78). Social media like
Facebook let political messages, co-produced by our peers, into a communicative
sphere where this integration process is actively and perpetually underway. These are
the spaces where the interplay of influence flows from mass media and personal
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relationships are mediated. When political messages inhabit these spaces, having
infiltrated them with the help of ethos-driven rhetoric, they gain the credibility and
authenticity to circulate and proliferate further.
The exploration of the new ways in which these messages, and presumably
also the influence they are meant to help project, proliferate within social
mediascapes is the central goal of this thesis and there are limits to the insights that
can be gleaned from examining the messages themselves. In this chapter I have
argued that the campaign was able to encode its messages with a rhetoric that helped
achieve the first of two new steps and that social media provided new channels and
venues for the second. Since the most important rhetorical tactics the campaign used
were variations on well-established strategies—reliance on ethos and persistent use of
the syntax of solidarity—I believe the first step is less fertile ground for scholarly
inquiry than the second. The new second step, however, is a function of new social
and technological realities to which the Obama campaign was among the first to
comprehensively and strategically react. The messaging strategy, while certainly
sophisticated on its own, also reflected a sophisticated recognition of the importance
of this new second step by introducing 'Barack' into the personalized social
mediascapes of supporters. In order to understand once he was inside, however, I had
to go to New Hampshire.
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Chapter 3: Social Media Conversations
Methods
The transformation of political communications brought about by the advent
and widespread adoption of social media utilities like Facebook is a phenomenon
characterized by a scope and a pace that renders scholarly inquiry uniquely
challenging. It is frenetic, complex and now nearly ubiquitous in North America and
western Europe. Quantitative analyses measure only the scale of this transformation
and identify broader trends among users of social media—political figures
increasingly using social media disseminate messages, for example, is a readily
quantifiable dimension of this phenomenon (Smith, 2009). But such an analysis
provides very little insight into the effect of this trend on the relationships between
politicians and their constituents. In this thesis, I have relied on research of this
nature, such as The Pew Internet & American Life Project's 2008 investigation of
Internet use during the campaign described in my first chapter. Smith's (2009)
research establishes my first premise: that the ways in which political ideas are
communicated to and between American young people have changed and are
continuing to change in dramatic ways. I liken this type of analysis to indicators such
as gross domestic product that aggregate patterns of economic activity: that more or
less money is changing hands between economic actors is important information, but
very little can be gleaned from these indicators about how?, or why? So in my first
chapter, I established that a certain type of communicative transaction is taking place
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with increasing frequency. I did not, however, answer the underlying questions about
how these transactions work and to what effect.
In my second chapter, I analyzed the Obama campaign's communications
strategy from a perspective that emphasized the specifically encoded rhetorical
properties of its messages. The goal of that chapter was to understand as much as
possible about how these increasingly common communicative transactions work by
examining their content. This too has its limitations as a method of inquiry because
messages are mediated not just by technology, but also by the social contexts of their
transmission. The goal of this thesis is to understand how the Obama campaign's
communications strategy might have promoted flows of influence between and
among supporters in addition to influencing the supporters themselves. My first two
chapters thus established important foundations for the primary qualitative inquiry
from which I derive my central conclusion that the campaign deployed tactics that
leveraged a potential for proliferating influence into and throughout social
mediascapes that is both intrinsic to Facebook itself and a function of the social
conventions governing its use. I conducted this research by applying techniques
adapted from various modes of ethnographic inquiry that accommodated the unique
challenges of my context: the final week of a Presidential campaign.
Between October 30th and November 4th, 2008, I interviewed 28 Obama
campaign volunteers in southwestern New Hampshire. My interviews, between 15
and 40 minutes in length, were semi-structured and organized loosely around three or
four standard questions. Half were conducted with groups of two or more people and
half were conducted one-on-one. My three criteria were that the individual be
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between the ages of 18 and 30, that he or she have volunteered with the campaign or
be in the process of volunteering with the campaign, and that he or she have used
Facebook at least once in the previous month. These were easy criteria to satisfy,
since a large proportion of Obama volunteers were young Facebook users. My
method, therefore, was determined largely by convenience. I volunteered to work on
the campaign myself and interviewed the people I worked with. The interviews took
place in a variety of physical settings, all related to campaign work, ranging from the
campaign office in the midst of the chaos and excitement of Election Day to placid
New England country roads while walking between voters' houses. My case was
neither strictly instrumental nor purely intrinsic; I take it to be instructive, but not
broadly representative. I chose southwestern New Hampshire because of my own
familiarity with the region and its politics, because there were numerous universities
in a relatively small area making it likely that there would be many young people
working on the campaign, and because it was the state with the most competitive race
to which I would be able to easily travel to from Montreal. As Robert Stake (1995)
succinctly notes, "if we can, we need to pick cases which are easy to get to and
hospitable to our inquiry" (1995:4).
My modes of interviewing and my position in relation to both the campaign
and my interview subjects were determined partially by necessity (campaigns, after
all, present specific challenges in terms of time and place) and partially by strategy.
My goal was to interview the people most likely to be engaged in the communicative
transactions I aimed to study at the time when they were most likely to be taking
place. Achieving this introduced challenges related to the nature of my role as a
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researcher. I was interviewing peers as both an Obama supporter and an academic
and, although I believe the two roles were compatible, I frequently subordinated the
latter to the former in order to foster the social dynamics that would yield the most
fruitful conversations. I was constantly shaping and calibrating my questions and
interview style in order to make the conversations less obtrusive to the campaign
work. With these challenges in mind, I drew on ethnographic work and
methodological theory by Jeff Todd Titon (1985), Janice Radway (1989), Joke
Hermes (1995), and Lisa Tillmann-Healy (2003), among others, to interrogate myself
as a researcher and formulate a concept of my role and its unique social properties. I
ultimately arrived at a methodology that combined a theory of power (or the
destabilization of power) between myself and my informants derived partially from
Radway's (1989) article, "Ethnography Among Elites" and concepts of my role and
identity that draw on both Titon' s (1985) work with American religious communities
and Tillmann-Healey's (2003) concept of "friendship as method" adapted to the
context of a campaign environment.
My relationship with my informants was characterized more by what we had
in common that by what distinguished us. In fact, my most significant differentiating
feature (one I will discuss in relation to my role and identity) was that I was carrying
a digital recorder. Radway observes that "the practice of ethnography has always
been at least covertly comparative and therefore implicitly preoccupied with the
world of the ethnographer" (1989:3). Acknowledging that this relationship between
researcher and informant necessitates a comparative, reflexive ethnography, I
positioned myself within my research as someone who meets all my own criteria.
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Beyond this basic level of proximity to my interviewees, I shared my ethnicity and
language with all of the 28 people I interviewed. (This fact seemed like a significant
aberration until I consulted the most recent census and discovered that New
Hampshire is 97% white.)7 Radway (1989) argues that power dynamics between
ethnographers and their informants are the product of the academic's monopoly on
the power of representation and writes that, among elites, this power is mitigated.
Elites command more power of self-representation; they also understand "what
academics 'do' and they can quite adequately imagine how they might be represented
in an academic discourse that would take them as its subject" (Radway, 1989:9).
Expecting that this would be true of my relationships as well, I was able to prepare
questions and interview strategies that were predicated on shared recognition of
relevant situations, for example, "looking up" acquaintances from one's hometown
after having left to go to university. This made my comparison transparent and
unthreatening, since I was comparing similar perspectives.
By applying a strategy similar to the comparative, reflexive ethnography
Radway (1989) advocates and offering my interviewees information about myself
that hinted at a proximity of experience, I was able to mitigate the degree to which the
answers I was given were designed with my power of representation in mind. I
invited this perceived proximity in order to broaden what Hermes (1996), citing
Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, terms the "interpretive repertoire" of
mutually recognized signifiers available in our conversation. This strategy was
successful, but it would have failed utterly had I not also established the single most
important feature of my identity: my support for Obama. All of the above dimensions
7 Demographic data tables viewed online at census.gov on October 23, 2009.
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of commonality that I shared with my informants proved less important than political
affiliation, a marker of identity, which, for many supporters in the last week of the
2008 campaign, was the only meaningful signifier of difference or commonality.
In his paper about the methodological complexities of conducting
ethnomusicological research with folk Baptists and Pentecostals, Jeff Titon (1985)
describes a scene in which he is sitting among a congregation of fundamentalist
Baptists in northern Appalachia. At the end of the sermon, the pastor asks for a show
of hands from the saved, prompting the following realization: "There is no avoiding
it: my hand fails to rise with the rest. By resolutely projecting my role and
maintaining my identity as a professional ethnomusicologist, I take my place among
the unsaved" (Titon, 1989:18). I would have been confronted with a similar problem
had I been unable to raise my hand without compromising my role as a researcher.
My role as a researcher and my identity as an Obama supporter (and a
Canadian, among other things) were compatible because both were authentic.8 At the
time, I had been a committed supporter since before the Primary campaign. Having
worked in southwestern New Hampshire throughout the hard-fought Primary
campaign the previous winter, I proudly displayed my bona fides in the form of an
"Obama ?8" vinyl sticker in the rear window of my car. (The stickers for the general
election said "Obama-Biden ?8.) Being sincere in my support for the candidate had
benefits beyond inclusion in social situations where I might have been out of place if
I had been unable to take my place among the saved; the myriad subtle signifiers of
belonging, some as trivial as my fluency in the language of Sarah Palin jokes, leant
8 Most of the supporters I met were unsurprised to learn that I was Canadian, possibly
because they already assumed the campaign to have international cultural and social
significance. I never asked my interviewees how they felt about my nationality.
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my conversations a mutual familiarity that made talking about Facebook and politics
seem perfectly natural. My research questions touched on topics, trends, and ideas
that could have been (and almost certainly were) fodder for normal friendly
conversation between young people performing campaign work together. I rarely
asked questions that would have been out of place in such a situation and the pace,
tone, and content of my conversations were frequently unchanged after I turned my
recorder off.
The relative fluidity with which I transitioned in and out of my interviewing
mode presented benefits and challenges similar to those Lisa Tilmann-Healy (2003)
encountered with her "friendship as method." She writes that "through authentic
engagement the lines between researcher and researched blur, permitting each to
explore the complex humanity of both self and other" (Tilmann-Healy, 2003:733).
My research was more narrowly defined than hers, focused as it was on complex
habits of political communication over a period of five days rather than "complex
humanity" over a period of many years, but we shared the centrality of "authentic
engagement." More specifically, her method, like mine, "involves the practices, the
pace and the ethics of genuine mutual engagement in a shared project about which all
participants are passionate" (Tilmann-Healy, 2003:734). And this is significant
because researching according to the practices, pace, and ethics of campaigning at a
time when passion (and Hope) infused every action and interaction limited the extent
to which my interviews intruded upon the normal social tempo and tenor of the
campaign. As Titon (1985) notes, "sometimes the fieldworker will find that he
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disturbs a situation less by participating in the events instead of merely observing
impassively and thereby putting a damper on the actors" (1985:21).
The specific social complexities of the ephemeral community fostered by
Obama supporters in southwestern New Hampshire demanded my authentic
engagement because their practices, pace, ethics and (perhaps most importantly)
passions would otherwise have been impediments to the casual, candid conversations
I hoped to have with them. Because of this necessity, my method entailed indulging a
bias that was not relevant to my research (that I supported Obama and shared the
passions expressed by my interviewees) in order to make the kinds of authentic
conversations that were relevant to my research (those that pertained to flows of
influence within social mediascapes) possible. When I travelled to New Hampshire,
my first goal was to establish my own authentic engagement. And one of the first
things I learned about the culture of the campaign community was that this goal
would not be hard to achieve.
Keene
I arrived in Keene, New Hampshire, at lam on the morning of October 30th,
2008. Keene is a town of about 20,000 people in the southwest corner of the state. It
is the political seat of Cheshire county and home to both Keene State College and
Antioch University, the former a public university, the latter private. In many ways,
Keene reflects the demographic, cultural, political, and socio-economic makeup of
the state. New Hampshire's "live free or die" libertarian streak is well represented, as
are environmental values usually associated with Vermont. With a median household
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income of 49,649, slightly below the national figure, it is not as economically
prosperous as the commuter towns close to Boston in the southeast corner of the state,
but richer than most of the northern counties. Levels of educational capital, however,
are 7% higher than the national average, with 34.6% having achieved at least a
Bachelor's degree. The number of degree granting institutions in Cheshire County (4)
might partially explain this relatively high figure, as might a general cultural
inclination toward higher education fostered by the town's location in the middle of
the northeaster "college belt." The town's most unique social characteristic is that
more than 95% of residents are white and born in the U.S., an unusually high number
that could limit the extent to which my findings can be taken as representative of the
country as a whole (Census).9 For my purposes, its value was its low median age and
electoral unpredictability.
Keene is one of those New England towns where the main street is still Main
Street, so I immediately drove down Main Street. I was looking for the county
headquarters of the Obama campaign and I was driving because the campaign
representative I'd spoken to prior to leaving had asked me two questions before
asking anything else: 1) "do you have a car?" and 2) "do you have somewhere to
stay." It felt like the kind of conversation you have with an army recruiter in wartime:
"Can you read the bottom line on that chart on the wall? Good; sign here, line up over
there." What was missing from the conversation was the critical piece of information
that would answer the question with which I'd been confronted when I arrived that
morning, namely, "where do I go now"?
9 All demographic and socioeconomic data are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2006-
2008 American Community Survey.
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The 2008 Obama Presidential campaign is now famous for its tech savvy. And
as I have shown in Chapter 1, deservedly so; my arrival in Keene was orchestrated by
the formidable networking software of the campaign. My.barackobama.com was a
tool for spatial organization as much as it was a tool for social organization. One of
the things it did very well was the gentle systematization of hyper-local politics; it
facilitated things like organizing debate-watching parties that became the social
nuclei of volunteer networking when it came time to pound the pavement. I listed my
location as Montreal, where I lived, and the software asked me where I wanted to
pitch in. I chose Keene because Fd volunteered there in the Primaries the previous
winter and because the concentration of students in what I expected to be a hard-
fought district made it fertile ground for this research. The software asked me what I
wanted to do and when, then put me in touch with organizers in Keene. But neither
Mybo nor the organizers I spoke with told me where the office was.
Not wanting to impose myself on the sophisticated billeting network the
campaign had built, I'd booked a room in a motel. I was ready to check in, but having
some experience with political campaigns, I knew there's always something
interesting to learn about the character of a race by what it looks and feels like in
these wee hours of the final week. So I drove slowly down Main Street looking for a
storefront plastered with Obama-Biden '08 signs. The action at this stage rarely takes
place at the address listed on the website. As a campaign grows, it takes over space in
the homes and businesses of supporters; anywhere there are tables to cut turf, lines for
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phone banks, and outlets for laptops. In the weeks before I arrived, the campaign's
Keene office annexed a warehouse a few blocks off the main drag, and that's where
most of the real work was being done. When I noticed a young couple wearing
Obama "sunrise" t-shirts over their jackets carrying packages of door-knockers, I
asked them where the vollie (volunteer) office was, they sent me to a warehouse.1 '
From outside, the warehouse felt like a prohibition-era speakeasy. No sign
gave it away, but you could hear music and the murmur of a crowd. As I walked in, I
was half expecting everything to stop and everyone to look at me as though I'd
stumbled upon some secret nocturnal meeting. Instead, I was barely noticed. Most
people seemed to be just hanging out, but those who were working were working
feverishly. The majority of the 30 or 40 people in the room seemed to be in their
twenties, but the youngest could have been in middle school and the oldest almost
certainly qualified for Medicare. The first thing anyone said to me was a single
syllable: "done?" The speaker, in flannel pajama pants, seemed ready to spend the
night doing whatever she was doing, and her next question—"ready for another
one?"—implied that she expected me to spend the night doing whatever it was she
thought I'd been doing.
As I've discussed earlier in my methods section, immersion was central to my
strategy. My reasons for planning my research around my own participation in the
campaign were validated immediately by the young organizer I spoke with when I
"Cutting turf is the nightly process by which the campaign's full-time staff review the
areas that were canvassed during the day, decide what areas will be canvassed the next day,
and prepare the correct packages of campaign materials for volunteers.
Door-knockers are cardboard flyers that are designed to hang on doorknobs. These are
usually distributed very late at night and usually by young volunteers. Hanging door-knockers
is one of the tasks that paradoxically seems to fuel energy, engagement, and enthusiasm for
the campaign because of (rather than in spite of) its grueling, caffeine-fuelled nature.
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first arrived in Keene that night. Political campaigns are spontaneous social networks
organized around a specific agenda. The closer Election Day gets, the more engaged
the network's constituents become, so the underlying trends and dynamics—really,
the social, cultural, and technological infrastructure of the network—become more
salient, but simultaneously more difficult to discern from the outside. In that final
week before Election Day, the nodes of this network—volunteer organizers,
campaign staff, and committed supporters—methodically divide the people they meet
between three categories: supporters, voters, and distractions. This is the time when
there's the most to learn from political campaigns and the movements they represent,
but it's also a difficult time to hang around soliciting interviews from people who
would rather be working for their candidate.
I therefore responded that I was, indeed, ready for another one. I spent the
next two hours re-organizing the VoteBuilder spreadsheets from the day's canvassing
and phone-banking.12 As I tallied undecideds, I started to explain myself to the
organizer who had put me to work. Kim was a 19-year-old who had just finished high
school and had taken her first semester of university off to volunteer with the
campaign. I started with my credentials: "I worked here on the primary campaign,
so it made sense to come back to a place I knew for the general." I made sure to add
that the area where I'd worked in January 2008 had gone for Hillary Clinton, giving
myself a more specific motivation for returning to Keene. Then I revealed that I was
researching the campaign for this thesis and that I intended to conduct interviews as I
12 VoteBuilder is the Democratic Party's database. It enables organizers to keep track of
which voters they've contacted and who those with whom they've spoken say they will be
supporting in order to identify undecided voters and, on Election Day, get likely voters to the
polls.
13 All of my interview subjects have been given pseudonyms.
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worked. As I started to explain some of my ideas to her, she became my first
subject.14 From that interview, a few of the small social nuances that would later
become consistent trends in my conversations, and even significant features of my
methodology, emerged for the first time.
This first interview began organically, as an outgrowth of the kind of
conversation volunteers were having in campaign offices across the country at the
same time. I asked her why she was working for Barack Obama and she asked me the
same thing. These conversations were all predicated on a self-evident truth, one
almost everyone I met advertised and one that, for my research, produced the
beneficial result of subverting any potential impact of the traditionally problematic
researcher-subject dynamic: that we were both part of the same movement and,
therefore, both ultimately there for variations of the same reason. When I explained
that I intended to collect interviews as I worked, she almost immediately began
asking me questions about my research. She wasn't the least bit surprised that I would
be studying the campaign; in fact it seemed perfectly obvious to her that someone
interested in social media and their application to politics would study their
intersection in the campaign.
As I started explaining some of the research questions I wanted to explore,
Kim's response to my ideas dictated the pace and structure of the conversation. This
pattern enabled me to skirt some of the potential problems identified in scholarly
theory concerned with open interviewing methods. Lewis (1991) argues that "normal
14 1 asked Kim to sign an HREC consent form at this stage, creating the first real interruption
to the flow of the conversation. In this case, as in many of my interviews, it seemed like my
producing this form was the only thing distinguishing the interview from a conversation we
might otherwise have had regardless.
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conversations do not usually involve the use of non-directive questions designed to
encourage someone to set the agenda for discussion" and goes on to note that "this
can be particularly awkward at the early stages of an interview" (1991:85). I rarely
encountered this kind of awkwardness; often, I would only have to explain my
research questions and describe the themes I intended to discuss before the
conversation would become engulfed in personal narrative. The process of
introducing the interview was a frequent catalyst for the substance of the interview.
This pattern continued through many of my interviews. When both parties
started with the assumption that the interview is secondary to the activity of
organizing spreadsheets or hanging door-knockers, discussing my research was easy
small talk. My subjects would first ask what I was studying, then ask what I thought.
This structure, of course, has its flaws—by first revealing at least that I believed there
was a significant (if difficult to describe) force of influence permeating Facebook in
the form of campaign messages co-authored by supporters, I inserted my own
assumption into the conversation, potentially inviting my interviewees to calibrate
their answers accordingly. But I found this wasn't the case. At this early, more casual
stage of the interview many of the people I spoke with tried to think of anecdotes
contradicting my premises. And regardless of the content of these early exchanges,
they never seemed to influence the tone or direction of the questions that followed. I
consider them to have been part of a priming process. My methodology was designed
to take into consideration a problem that most researchers would love to have;
namely, that everyone I met wanted to talk about Facebook and Obama.
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This first interview established what would become a pattern of talking about
my research and the ideas that motivated my research as a preface or introduction to
the actual interview. It meant that by the time the interview got underway and I began
asking my planned questions, many of my subjects were already thinking of their own
experiences, preparing to respond to questions they assumed they would be asked,
such as the question "do you think there are more people on Facebook supporting
Obama or more supporting McCain?" Sometimes the people I spoke with would
launch into anecdotes unprompted. Because everyone I interviewed was a Facebook
user and an active Obama supporter, almost everyone I spoke with felt that they knew
a lot about my subject. An interesting trend that persisted throughout a majority of my
interviews, was that my subjects seemed surprisingly confident in their answers.
Lewis (1991) writes that "interviews, particularly those that use a relatively 'open'
interviewing style, resemble narratives" (1991:93). The source of my informants'
confidence might be found at the intersection of this assertion and Radway's (1989)
theory of power residing in representation: by couching their answers in anecdotes,
they were able to claim significant control of the narrative.
Kim was perhaps the interview subject who best exemplified this reliance on
anecdotes to explain how she and her peers influenced each other's political opinions
using social media. One of the questions I asked in each interview was based on a
scenario in which the interviewee is hypothetically trying to persuade a peer to
support Obama. The point of the question is to encourage the interviewee to reflect on
his or her own instinctive use of Facebook as a tool of persuasion. Part of what I
wanted to learn is whether Obama supporters saw it as a medium that makes this kind
69
of active influence easier than it would be if they were face to face or using another
medium. When I asked Kim whether she would use Facebook to persuade this
hypothetical peer, I was surprised to find her reaching for her white, Hope-clad
Macbook. There were two browser windows already open-—one was the VoteBuilder
web interface and the other was her Facebook "wall." Her only verbal answer to my
question, after gesturing toward a wall post, was the following:
"Let me show you an example ofthat that I did the other day. This is my
friend who I know. He's not registered to vote, and probably won't. I
wrote to him the other day. I sent him a video. So that's what I would
do!" (interview October 30, 2008).
Kim was a full-time volunteer. Not only was her computer adorned with Obama
livery, her body was literally covered in campaign stickers while we were conducting
our interview. Her responses were instructive, but I don't take them to be
representative of major trends in my findings because she's not representative of most
young Obama supporters; she took common patterns of engagement to the extreme.
She was using every medium she could think of, including her sticker-plastered arms,
to support the campaign. What's more telling about this interview is relevant to my
methodology. For everyone I met, questions about Facebook are treated as personal
questions. And interestingly, they were personal questions to which my interview
subjects often felt comfortable offering very personal answers.
The rest of my process began the next morning. Because I could offer a car,
my job during daylight hours was usually to ferry groups of volunteers to and from
the turfs they had been assigned to canvass. Many of my interviews were conducted
70
in the car or while walking between houses and six were with two or three people at
one time. I always explained my research and distributed consent forms before
leaving the staging area, but the pretense was still the same: we were campaigning;
there just happened to be a digital recorder running. The group interviews in these
situations were among the most fruitful. The groups almost always found something
to disagree about and the ensuing debates drew out important insights. The rest of
my interviews were conducted either at the campaign headquarters while organizing
pamphlets and knockers or on the street with volunteers doing "viz".15 Each of my
interviews was conducted in a different situation with a different series of
challenges, both social and logistical.
Because of the diversity of social situations in which my conversations took
place, the structure and pace of each was different. My challenge in synthesizing my
findings from these interviews has been to discern broadly congruent themes from 28
unique conversations. Three salient clusters of thoughts emerged from this entropie
corpus: ideas relating to the ways in which the campaign was making it easy for
young people to use social media as venues for contact that might not otherwise be
made, ideas relating to the perceived public nature of political identity within social
media spaces, and ideas relating to the specific modes of projecting political
messages engendered by Facebook. These three themes—contact, perception, and
projection—are distinct pillars of a communicative system that is as subtle as it is
pervasive. Indeed, despite the widespread recognition of social media's presence as a
factor in the 2008 campaign, it remains inadequately understood, even as it heralds a
"Viz," short for "visibility," is a campaign tactic where groups of volunteers are organized
to hold up signs and attract attention to themselves at strategic places and times.
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generational shift in the way political identity is constructed and projected. That the
Obama campaign, as a political community and an associated brand, benefited from
this shift was not coincidental, so this instance of symbiosis between a medium and a
movement is revelatory of both.
The Power of Easy
For political campaigns, there's a big difference between communicating with
a crowd and communicating with an individual. Communicating with crowds is
important—it's what they spend millions of dollars doing with advertising and
thousands of hours doing with speeches and rallies. But direct contact, be it by phone,
direct mail, email, or now social media, is how campaigns identify and mobilize
supporters. A person who sees an ad or hears a speech may or may not become a
supporter, but when the campaign calls someone and actually speaks with an
individual directly or sends out an email with a "donate" link, there's a feedback
process. The campaign can target supporters and turn them into message multipliers.
This is one of the reasons social media represent a significant change for politics; a
campaign can establish this dialogue with a supporter, say through a "group," in a
semi-public way, combining the breadth of a broadcast medium with the granular
targeting of a direct medium.
The importance of contact—both establishing it and leveraging it—is why one
of the first questions I asked in every interview was "how did you get involved with
the campaign." Answers ranged from "I walked into this building five minutes ago"
to an explanation given by one committed Democrat that amounted to a long list of
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activist groups (to which, presumably, this supporter belonged) that had endorsed
Barack Obama. One significant pattern I noticed, however, was a relatively uniform
emphasis on 'joining'. In about half my interviews someone answered that they had
joined some sort of political group or organization and in seven cases it was a
Facebook group that the supporter first joined. Most supporters I interviewed stressed
the effortless way in which they were able to establish a dialogue with the campaign
and begin to engage actively, but they talked about it like it was a club that was just
very easy to get into. This 18-year-old male supporter's answer is typical of that
attitude:
"I signed up for Students for Obama, and they emailed me that way.
Also, Facebook groups in my local county—all the high schools were
starting to support him, so they all started to work for the campaign. I
started one in my high school" (interview November 3, 2008).
A sense of belonging, community and shared purpose are among the very few
things political campaigns offer volunteers in exchange for their hours of service, so
it's strategically savvy to let potential supporters feel that these are easy things to get
once they click the "join" button. Making the campaign feel accessible used to be
something that could only be achieved through the style and tone of official
messaging, but social media enables the proliferation of nodes within an expanding
community network. Supporters can now display their own Facebook welcome mats
and open the door to the campaign for their peers. Of course, this wouldn't have been
nearly as successful as it was if the campaign's more centralized or official web
outreach efforts weren't sophisticated enough to bridge the (potentially substantial)
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cognitive gaps between noticing that a peer has started a Facebook group, joining the
group personally, and contacting the campaign. One thing savvy political campaigns
appeared to have learned from online marketers by the fall of 2008 was a kind of
vertical integration of communications—once they had a potential voter's attention,
they offered lots of easy, casual, and intuitive ways to take the next step in a sequence
that leads to volunteering, putting up a lawn sign or starting an online group. It's the
same technique that a car manufacturer uses: an online campaign turns a single click
into a test drive through a series of coordinated steps leading ultimately to a sign-up
form without ever making the potential buyer feel like they're being asked to engage
too much or go too far beyond his or her normal habit of browsing for a new car.
Everyone I spoke with said becoming involved with the campaign was easy.
That I didn't encounter a single person who told me a story about struggling to find a
way to contribute was surprising for me. Because the people I interviewed were
young, I wasn't able to ask a lot of them to compare this experience to previous
campaigns—indeed, for the majority, it was their first—so I'm left with my own
casual empiricism in this area. I've worked on numerous Canadian federal and
provincial campaigns in the past and I've had many conversations with volunteers
who have felt the campaign made it difficult for them to find ways to contribute. But
regardless if this pattern was new or unique to the campaign, it was uniform enough
to warrant consideration, particularly to the extent that it helps explain how or why
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the young people whose participation had been dismissed by pundits and observers
voted and volunteered in record numbers.16
The Obama campaign inserted portals to engagement in the mediascapes where
these people were learning about politics and expressing their own political opinions.
This is significant even on the most basic level: that the campaign was there, that it
was present in ways that made sense to these young people, was a significant part of
its successful contact strategy. An 1 8-year-old student, henceforth referred to as Brad,
expressed something like approval as he described having first discovered the
campaign's Facebook presence: "I think something that's new, that I didn't
experience before, was the interaction with the campaign; how you can share that
with the other people on Facebook." Another respondent, a 21 -year-old Keene State
student I'll call May, explained the significance of the campaign's Facebook presence
in more longitudinal terms in response to my questions about how she became
involved in the campaign. She said Facebook was instrumental, then went on to
describe the following sequence:
"I got invited by somebody through one of those group things...
Somebody who was in it—I don't even know the person, they just added
me because we had a class together or something—they sent me an
invitation to their club, and I volunteered—and here I am" (interview
November 2, 2008).
The Tufts University Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and
Engagement reports a 5% increase in turnout nationwide among 18-to-29 year-olds
comparing the 2008 election to the 2004 election and a 1 5% increase over 1 996.
(civicyouth.org, accessed October 27, 2009).
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It's impossible to know whether a variation of this sequence would have taken place
had the initial Facebook exchange not provided the catalyst, but the significance of
this narrative is that she saw it as a perfectly normal pattern, but one in which she
invested no action or agency until she decided to contact a volunteer office. This is
partially a story of a peer actively persuading May to become involved, but it's just as
important to note the casual fluidity implied by the phrase "and here I am." She's
describing a portal that—with a little help from an Obama supporter—-was
remarkably easy to walk through. With respect to the active supporter's role, it will
suffice for my purposes to note that political campaigns have always relied on/upon
surrogates to carry their messages into social situations that demand a particular kind
of access, but Facebook makes it possible for more supporters to act as surrogates in
more situations.
Surrogates, of course, aren't always needed to introduce potential supporters to the
campaign. When social media is the neighborhood in question, often all it takes is a
communications strategy that invites the feeling that the campaign lives nearby. I spoke
with two siblings on Election Day, an 1 8-year-old woman and her 28-year-old brother,
both of whom had travelled to New Hampshire from Vermont to participate in the get-out-
the-vote (GOTV) effort of the more competitive state. Dawn was volunteering in her first
political campaign. Even though I knew the answer would be more a function of her age
than of any other variable, I asked her my stock question: "why this time around." She
was waiting with the following response almost before I asked the question: "I think that it
ties into a lot of how younger people are accessing their information about politics—we're
able to get it through the Internet, and not just in the morning paper." She then went on to
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describe her ability to "access" Obama online as contributing to her motivation, observing
that "it's really easy for our generation to have access to the candidate [by] going to his
website." The most interesting thing about this response is the leap she made by
responding to a question about her motivation for supporting a candidate with an
observation about how the campaign communicated well within the mediascape she chose
to inhabit. She seemed to be saying the equivalent of 'we just travel in the same circles.'
The Power of Perceiving
A well-executed contact strategy can explain a lot about how the young
people I spoke with became involved in the Obama campaign. It can even begin to
explain parts of why they chose to engage—I heard at least two answers that might be
paraphrased as "they opened a door, so I walked through it." But it explains very little
about the role of mediated online systems of peer relationships in motivating
engagement. Contact is relevant to my research because it establishes that the
threshold was easy enough to cross that the forces of influence supplying the impetus
for engagement might have been subtle. Indeed, I believe they were aggregates of
nudges and cues mediated by online spaces like Facebook that required only
perception to provide persuasion. That is why one of my most important sequences of
questions focused on perception. Asking young people whether they believe they are
influenced by their peers is like asking them whether they think they are capable of
thinking for themselves—the answer, of course, is predictable. The question I asked
instead was "do you know what your friends think?" The answer to this question also
proved predictable, but tellingly so.
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Most of the Obama volunteers I spoke with knew a lot about their peers'
politics. This isn't surprising on its face because most people have a pretty good
intuitive sense of their peers' politics. What was surprising is the level of detail they
were able to express about the political values held by people they didn't know well
and the political brands with which these relatively distant acquaintances had
affiliated themselves. Because anecdote was a favored strategy for responding to
these questions, I heard a lot of stories in these interviews about learning funny or
unexpected things about the politics of former friends and friends-of-friends. I spoke
with two 22-year-old women that had made the trip from Wellesley College in
Massachusetts who seemed particularly amused to recount their Facebook discoveries
about people they'd known in their respective hometowns. Here's how Lynne, from a
small town in Florida, described the experience:
"I just had three kids who I was in elementary school with friend me on
Facebook. Before I went on their profiles, I was kind of guessing, 'So
where are you right now?' I was absolutely correct—two of them are
enrolled in the military and are very conservative, and one of them is a
hemp-wearing liberal" (interview October 31, 2008).
She had her suspicions about these people and Facebook not only let her confirm
them, it gave her a tool for canvassing her social network and categorizing everyone
in it. The most significant thing about this response, something that became one of the
most salient trends among answers to these questions, was the certainty and clarity
with which the people I interviewed seemed to be able to read the Facebook-mediated
signifiers of political brand affiliation.
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Kim, the organizer I spoke with on my first day in Keene, might have been the
person to describe the effect of this system of political signification most concisely.
She noted that "[in her] group of friends, if there is a Republican, they will stick out."
Maybe this says more about her group of friends than it does about the medium, but
the words "they will stick out" stuck out for me. She is not just saying that most of
her friends are co-branding their online identities with the Democratic Party, she is
saying that she notices the co-branding practices of all her friends. As I was
researching this question, I felt that the most stubborn challenge I would have to
contend with would be demonstrating that this dynamic is something new. After all,
people have been co-branding themselves with political parties, using every medium
from their car bumpers to their hairstyles, for as long as there have been political
parties; the practice is now central to the nature of modern politics.
Perhaps the most famous shift in the way politics are practiced (and perceived)
that has been directly attributed to a particular medium is that which attended the
arrival of television. Discussing the results of his survey suggesting a correlation
between the popularization of television and increasing emphasis among voters on the
personal qualities of Presidential candidates, Scott Keeter (1987) argues that "the
efficacy with which television reaches potential voters has changed the campaign
behavior of candidates and the personal traits they stress" (1987:355). But television
didn't change the nature of politics; it changed the way political brands are
constructed, as the famous Nixon-Kennedy debate demonstrated. The lesson of this
resonant moment in media history, when radio listeners favored Nixon while
television viewers preferred Kennedy, isn't that a new medium can change the way a
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candidate is perceived; it's that a new medium can change the relative importance of
individual traits within a constellation of mediated attributes (Schudson, 1996:1 17).
Social media could be heralding a similar shift, but the difference is that the
network itself, and by extension the individuals who compose it, is the fabric of the
medium. So where television might have shifted voters' focus or emphasis toward
Kennedy's apparent confidence and physical charisma, Facebook would shift them
toward traits that are easily mediated favorably in the form of a wall post. My second
chapter posited a hypothetical theory of how the campaign might have foregrounded
rhetoric to which social mediascapes might be particularly hospitable, but proving
such a theory would exhaust the potential of my methodology. For my purposes, it is
sufficient to establish the possibility of such a system by demonstrating that my
interviewees perceived their peers' opinions and images as political texts that they did
and would have little trouble reading.
Learning that most of my interviewees understood the politics of their peers
through the use of social media in ways that were more stable and precise than the
understanding that would have been possible without their use of these media
established an important premise: that our politics are, indeed, now more public,
though no less personal. That is to say, our political opinions are still an important
part of our identities—and perhaps an increasingly important part of the way young
people construct them, as I will discuss later—but it's also something that two thirds
of my interviewees said they would describe as public information. And the questions
I asked about the degree to which my interviewees thought they knew the political
opinions held by their peers also served an important priming purpose for the
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corollary questions that followed: If they knew so much about their peers, then did
they think their own politics were public? And if they did, how accurately did they
think the political identity their peers perceived reflected their own perception oí their
own politics? A strong majority of the people I spoke with thought that their politics
were something personal, but something anyone could know, like their hair colour.
This result indicates a broad trend toward openness about politics in spaces like
Facebook among young people.
What I am able to infer from the answers to these questions is, however, limited
somewhat by my methodology. I spoke with campaign volunteers, people who are
much more likely to be outwardly expressive of their political opinions than non-
volunteers. Given these limitations, I found it fruitful to focus more on my questions
about the relationship between my interviewees' Facebook identities and their 'real
world' identities. One question in particular produced a scattered but compelling
collection of answers. This question was based on the following hypothetical
scenario: "Imagine we'd never met face-to-face, but we were communicating online
through Facebook, would I think you're more or less political than you really are?"
Interviewees answered "more," "less," and variations on "about the same" in almost
equal numbers. Brad, for example, said I would not think him more political than he
really is and added that I might get a de-politicized identity if I'd met him in person,
offering this explanation:
"A lot of students might join groups, put things on their pages that they
wouldn't say in person because they wouldn't feel comfortable saying it.
They feel more comfortable in that zone saying it, and expressing it that
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way and letting people know how they feel" (interview November 4,
2008).
That he assumes his peers (and, presumably, he himself) would feel more comfortable
broadcasting a political opinion in ways that make it potentially visible to hundreds of
people at once rather than expressing it in a private conversation is instructive. Since
the advent of MySpace, a great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to
questions of social media privacy, but only recently have these acknowledged that
privacy is not a not a fixed concept; different mediascapes are subject to different
norms (Lenhart and Madden, 2007:20). And according to the social conventions that
govern the sharing of political messages in Facebook, politics are welcome (Pempek
et al., 2009:232).
The question I asked about the fidelity of their online identities to their
personal image of their own politics divided my interviewees in ways that I haven't
been able to fully explain. Because a sizeable majority told me that they did express
their politics online, I can only infer from the tone of the scattered responses to the
more nuanced questions asking how they felt about their Facebook presence that my
question provoked feelings about the medium itself as well as feelings about how
it's used. This question could have been better calibrated to dodge what I now see as
the quicksand of asking these young people a convoluted version of "which is the
real you?" Still, the response I received from Brad might inform the others. He
assumed that Facebook was a "comfortable" place for politics and that there were
many people, like him, who felt it was a natural venue for political opinions they
were too intimidated to express in other situations. There were complex issues left
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unresolved by these responses, but the simpler and larger questions were answered
with resounding clarity: Facebook is both a public space and a political space. As
both, it bends the latter to the rules of the former (and those of the medium),
subjecting politics to perception.
The first question in this series required only that my respondents reflect on
the political identities projected by their peers and it produced almost uniform
results. As the questions started to approach issues of the respondents' own
identities (and maybe invite an expression of their ambivalence about Facebook),
they became less consistent. But this pattern is potentially significant even if it
resists a cohesive theory of the degree to which young people construct their online
political identities to accurately reflect their 'real world' identities because so many
respondents chose answers that revealed opinions about the medium. It is important,
first, that they feel they can construct political identities and, second, that they feel
that can do so in a public way. These responses reinforced that Facebook is both a
public space and a political space while introducing other interesting questions
about the ways in which politics are becoming part of a public process of identity
formation for some young people.
On Election Day I asked Alexa, a 26-year-old Keene State student from
Germany, whether she was noticing a lot of her peers expressing their politics online
and her response was "almost everybody. Like McCain buttons or Obama buttons,
and pages, and 'supports', and this thing of donating your status." Then when I
asked her my hypothetical question about how I might perceive her politics if we'd
only ever interacted online, she gave this response: "it's possible that you'd think I
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am more political than I actually am. You can really manipulate facts with
Facebook. You can create an image which is not really matching with reality." For
my purposes, there's little value in determining whether or not Alexa considers it
important to accurately represent her politics online; what's important is that she
feels she has control over the way she's perceived when she expresses a political
opinion. And this was consistent among most of my respondents. Whether they
thought their Facebook politics and their 'real world' politics were the same or not,
they thought they possessed a power of self-representation and that their peers
possessed the same power. Given the fact that most thought they knew a lot about
their peers' politics, I am able to infer from these reflections on the nature of the
medium that, in the very least, social media are generating primary texts of new
public processes of identity formation.
The Power of Projection
There are two ways young people use social media to influence their peers; the
first is by actively reaching out with a message and the second is by attaching a
message to their own online identity in a visible way and passively letting it permeate
the online spaces they inhabit. The first is deployed for projecting political opinions
in much the same way many other media are, but the tactics warrant consideration. I
asked every interview subject I spoke with whether they would use Facebook if they
wanted to convince a peer they didn't know very well to support Barack Obama and a
majority responded that they would, but perhaps not actively. To understand why, I
return to Brad's observations. Persuading a peer to vote a certain way is, of course, a
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socially delicate endeavor and one that isn't easy in many social situations. Many of
the people I spoke with indicated that they weren't likely to actively try to persuade
their peers to support Barack Obama, but that when forced to imagine themselves in
the hypothetical scenario I had constructed, they would use Facebook. This response,
given by Allan, a 28-year-old University of Massachusetts Artificial Intelligence and
Robotics student, is an illustrative example:
"I think a lot of people are afraid to speak up. One thing that's
interesting about the Facebook thing is that it's easier to speak up,
maybe, and say you have contrary viewpoints. If you're only saying it
online... you're not actually near the people who might see your status"
(interview November 1, 2008).
Other media, like email and text messaging, are more intimidating channels for
political rhetoric because it might seem to the recipient of these messages that that the
sender was trying too hard. Again, politics are now connated with Facebook because
political messages travel so easily within its mediascape.
The shape and content of political messages transmitted via Facebook between
peers varied, from simple messages with links to articles to videos posted on a peer's
"wall" to interesting devices like the "pin" shown here (Figure 4)". The simplest
messaging strategy was actually the least common. Only one person said he would
send a peer a private message. Every other strategy made the message public. Allan
described the following popular strategy:
"Once you put your status, then other people can comment on it. I can
imagine typing up a comment on someone else's status in response to
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one of their friends who said something that I disagreed with. I've done
that once or twice" (interview November 1, 2008).
What is significant about this particular strategy is that it has no offline or traditional
media equivalent. It's hard to imagine this supporter noticing a McCain-Palin lawn
sign in his neighborhood and knocking on the door to start a conversation in response.
He explicitly described having done this with someone he had never met, but he
didn't consider it a particularly outgoing act. He described attaching a political
message to the public status update posted by his peers in a way that suggests he
considers it to have been a casual act, something that was likely to be received
passively even by someone who didn't share his opinions. The person whose status he
commented on had created a public text. The ethics of collective creation associated
with web 2.0 are now seemingly so internalized by young people that the pairing of
two contradictory messages authored by two different people within a text that
explicitly describes the status of only one of the authors is now treated as mundane.
The pins shown above, similarly, enable Obama supporters to project their politics in
ways that attach messages to their peers' online identities without transgressing
against the social norms of the space. Political pins, of course are not new. What's
new is the prospect of attaching one to someone else. 17
These pins must be "accepted" before they appear on the profile of the receiver. Though it
may not be possible to attach a pin to a peer's identity without their consent, these devices
seem to be subject to an 'opt-out' convention. Likely because I only spoke with Obama
supporters, everyone who brought up the Obama pins said they accepted them. None of my
interviewees said they had offered pins to their peers.
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Figure 4: An Obama "button" sent as a "public gift" on Election Day.
It was illuminating to discover that even in one-to-one communication, when
the people I interviewed had communicated a specific message directly and actively
to a specific message recipient, he or she chose to do it in public ways. He or she used
forms that broadcasted the message throughout their network, presumably because a
less intimate message is a less intimidating message. This brings me to the second
mode of projecting politics using social media. The most common form of political
expression using social media that I encountered was the Facebook "status" update.
The rapid ascent of Twitter (a platform dedicated entirely to a variant of the status
update) since the 2008 Presidential election suggests that this trend has broader
implications. For my purposes, it serves as the most important example of passive
projection. One person I spoke with told me proudly that she had changed her status
to "palling around with terrorists," an ironic reference to Sarah Palin's then-notorious
campaign trail rhetoric. Other passive projection strategies, like using the campaign's
"sunrise" logo as a profile picture were mentioned—Allan even told me that all his
friends were changing their middle names on Facebook to "Hussein"—but the use of
the status update was by far the most pervasive.
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A status update is almost the ideal passive projection tactic. As a form, it's
constrained by a series of conventions the most important of which is the imperative,
prescribed by the hard-coded "John Doe is..." mechanism that Facebook used at the
time, to describe oneself. It is almost impossible to be perceived as going too far or
trying too hard by one's peers when this convention is maintained. Of course, the
convention is easily subverted or appropriated in ways similar to the "palling around
with terrorists" même, but because of its passive nature the Facebook status became
the most casual, comfortable and unthreatening rhetorical maneuver available to the
young people I spoke with. It benefited from greater reach than a wall post because it
appeared in their peers' "news feeds," but it was never impeded by the social
complexities of singling out individuals to receive a message. Status updates also
have the unique property of carrying social momentum, sometimes even achieving
rapid, almost viral wave effects. One such wave was the status "John Doe is voting"
on Election Day, a phenomenon that should be considered in the context of the
record-breaking turnout among young people in 2008 (CIRCLE, 2009).
On Election Day, more than half of the people I interviewed said they had
changed their status to a political message. Of course it is to be expected that people
who care about politics will express political opinions on Election Day, but that is not
what is most significant about the status trend. The notion that a status is the online
equivalent of a lawn sign, something displayed on an individual's property that
expresses that individual's opinions, is half right. These people used status updates to
describe their own politics, not to evangelize on behalf of a particular candidate to
their peers. It was an act of self-branding, something personal, yet it was entirely
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visible throughout their networks. If status updates were like lawn signs, then they're
lawn signs supporters can install in front of their peers' houses without permission.
(Or more aptly, given that news feeds are "private," in their peers' living rooms.) And
they would have done it without violating the social conventions of the medium. The
power of social media as a venue for the projection of politics is in its simultaneously
public and personal nature.
Embedded in the very concept of Facebook is the premise that everything one
posts is a description of oneself—it's personal in that most direct and concrete of
ways. When you sign up for Facebook you see the form shown here (Figure 5). On
the most basic level, everyone who has a Facebook page has undergone a process of
defining their online identity by filling out these fields. For most people this process
is a bricolage combining the music, television, film, and literature that reflect the
user's tastes with the brands and institutions (academic institutions are central here)
that serve to locate him or her geographically and sometimes socio-economically.
Politics are one of the markers of identity that the software invites new users to apply
to themselves. Confirming the significance of this architecture, Pempek et al. (2009)
found that among the 51% of the American college students they studied who
expressed their politics in their profile, a third said they added the information
because "Facebook had a place to insert it" (2009:232). Further research is needed to
fully understand the specific effects of this invitation, particularly on younger people
for whom it's possible that signing up for a Facebook profile may have been part of a
very early process of defining political identity. It is likely that, for many teenagers.
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choosing an option from Facebook's dropdown menu would have been one of the
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Figure 5: This is one of the forms Facebook provides to help new users build
Of course, Obama volunteers between the ages of 18 and 30 in the fall of 2008
were a group that used Facebook's built-in tools for defining political identity in more
sophisticated ways. Violet, a volunteer who at 30 was participating in her first
campaign, described her use of these tools as follows:
"Where you can write your political views mine says 'go Obama'. In my
'what I am doing', it's been 'is voting for Obama' or 'is hopeful for
change'—something along those lines. And I've got my Obama flair on
my Facebook page!" (interview November 3, 2008).
Natalie, an 18-year-old student also participating in her first campaign who I
interviewed at Election Day while she was holding a sign outside the polling place,
described similar tactics:
"Under my interests, it says Obama; under the little box—the new box
they've created under the profile picture, it says 'get out and vote today'.
My status is 'standing at the polls—get out and vote Obama, and go all
the way down the ballot'" (interview November 4, 2008)
It's easy to understand intuitively why it requires less energy, less commitment, and
less fervour to describe a personal opinion than to evangelize: "I am" is a statement
that's subject to much lower social barriers than "you should be". The social
conventions of Facebook recognize this explicitly. All but two of the people I
interviewed said they had political messages on their Facebook profiles, but far fewer
said they would use Facebook to reach out to a specific peer with a specific message.
These young people overwhelmingly chose to project their politics and persuade their
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peers to support Obama by embedding political messages in their most visible and
public expressions of their own identity.
My findings show that the young people I interviewed expressed their support
for Obama by associating themselves with the campaign's messages and the
candidate's brand using a process by which they simultaneously define their own
political identities and influence those of their peers. Each of the three patterns of
responses I observe engenders these parallel processes in a different way. First,
contact functions as a system of forces, some driven by the campaign's tactics, others
by the agency of individual supporters, that draws the campaign's messages and the
candidate's brand into the social mediascape. This serves the dual purpose of
enabling these messages and images to proliferate throughout the social mediascape
as supporters adopt them and creating a bridge out of the social mediascape into the
MyBo, traditional media, or a campaign office. In the case of Facebook, this system
is predicated on the medium's intrinsic hospitality toward politics, but it is also a
reflection of the attitude expressed by most of my interviewees that politics are public
in these spaces.
To the extent that it is a product of the social conventions governing the
expression of politics using Facebook, this notion that politics are public within the
social mediascape makes it possible for young people to feel like they know a lot
about their peers' politics. Because its fidelity to 'real world' opinions or political
affiliations is subject to considerable play, I use the phrase "perceiving politics" to
describe a system of political signification according to which young people create
public texts describing their own political identity and perceive those of their peers.
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This system creates a social platform for the pattern of projection that I observed
when I asked my interviewees how they presented their politics when they wanted to
influence their peers. I discovered that passive projection was preferred to active
projection, but that given the system of perception I observed, it might be more
effective. I conclude that contact, perception and projection combined constitute a
new platform from which simple messages like "Violet is hopeful for change" are




When a new technology is first used in a way that demonstrates pervasive
changes in our patterns of communication, an impossible question is inevitably asked:
was it the innovation of a pioneering user that determined the way it was used or did
the technology itself determine the way it was used? This question is to
communication theory as the "Great Man" question is to history. Thomas Carlyle
famously wrote that "the history of the world is but the biography of great men,"
provoking energetic (and sometimes vitriolic) rebuttals from scholars claiming that he
had it all wrong, that history is shaped by broad structural forces and social currents
(1966: 2). Of course, like most useful dialectics, this debate never yields a stable
answer and neither does its equivalent in the study of media. Tectonic shifts in our
modes of communicating are neither the product of the innovative use of a new
technology, nor are they a function of its intrinsic properties; both are conditions for
transformational change.
I have argued in this thesis that social media are transforming the way
political campaigns communicate, but Barack Obama's new media team did not bring
about this change and the media themselves did not determine the way the Obama
campaign used them. These media made a new structure of communicative
relationship possible and the Obama campaign was the first organized messaging
effort to demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the new structure. Carolyn
Marvin (1990) introduces her seminal social history of nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century electronic communication with a bold claim: "in a historical sense,
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the computer is no more than an instantaneous telegraph with a prodigious memory"
(3). She compares the arrival of the telegraph with that of Gutenberg's printing press,
arguing that these two transformational moments in media history both brought about
structural changes in our patterns of communication. If, however, structural change is
the standard according to which a new' technology is categorized, then the rise of
social media deserves to share Marvin's top tier of transformation with the printing
press and the telegraph.
There are elements of the ways in which I observed the Obama supporters in
New Hampshire expressing political ideas that are like the telegraph: they used
Facebook's direct messaging tool in much the same way that most people send email.
These media are characterized by a one-to-one structure of communication, with
messages travelling (initially, at least) only between a sender and a receiver. For the
most part, this how the campaign itself communicated with its supporters: they sent
emails and Facebook messages designed to solicit money, to encourage volunteering
or to generally build and reinforce imagined community, but these messages were
only the first of two steps in the new structure. The second step is the social
mediation of messages is their proliferation throughout spaces like Facebook within
which they are reproduced, co-produced, or remixed by or with its original recipient.
And it is through this second step that the new structure channels transformational
forces. For the message to appear within the social mediascape in a visible place, like
a Facebook "wall" or "status" update, it must first be channeled through a social
referencing process that weaves the message into the identity of the person sending or
posting it. An organization that can build communities in these spaces, therefore, is an
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Organization that can create venues for the proliferation of messages that are infused
with the authenticity and credibility of their co-production with a supporter as they
pass through the second step.
Clay Shirky (2008) recently gave a lecture at the U.S. State Department in
which he described how the Obama campaign recognized the importance of the
second step in this new structure: "In a world where media is global, social,
ubiquitous, and cheap; in a world of media where the audience are increasingly full
participants; in that world, media is less and less often about crafting a single message
to be consumed by individuals. More and more often it's a way of creating an
environment for convening and supporting groups." He was referring primarily to
MyBo, but more broadly, to a communications strategy based on the assumption that
the campaign would not maintain control over its messages. They were able to encode
their messages with rhetorical tactics designed to facilitate the first step, but once the
campaign's signifiers entered the social mediascape, their meanings were
renegotiated according to the ways in which supporters chose to mediate them. This
renegotiation is the part of the process that makes social media structurally different,
not just another way to move text and images around with electricity.
There have been four technological revolutions in the history of our collective
ability to communicate, according to Shirky (2008): print, the telegraph, "recorded
media other than print," then finally "the harnessing of electromagnetic spectrum to
send text and image through the air." He points out "a curious asymmetry" in this list:
"the media that's good at creating conversations is no good at creating groups and the
media that's good at creating groups is no good at creating conversations." His point
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is that the internet is good at both because everyone is both producer and consumer of
content. Where these four media limit their users to either creating one message and
disseminating it throughout a large group or creating a message designed to travel
though a one-to-one medium and foster a conversation, social media let conversations
happen in large groups. The internet is generally good at creating conversations
within groups, but social media like Facebook are particularly good at promoting
conversations because they make it easy to contribute. It was possible for engaged,
enthusiastic supporters of the Dean campaign to create conversations within their
group—in blogs or email chains, for instance—but it wasn't easy; it demanded
engagement and enthusiasm. The one idea that seemed to emerge from all my
interviews was that becoming part of the conversation convened by the Obama
campaign in 2008 was easy.
Of course, commenting on the Dean campaign's blog in 2004 wasn't
technically, intellectually, or physically hard; it was, however, socially harder than
most of the ways the Obama supporters I interviewed chose to engage with the
campaign's conversation. The modes of expression that I found most common, like
adopting and reconfiguring Obama tropes to use them in status updates and profile
pictures, demanded only that the supporter feel part of an imagined community. If
they felt like the campaign was something in which they were personally,
authentically invested, then integrating pieces of the campaign's brand into their
normal process of curating their online identity is a mundane, almost trivial behavior.
Or at least it is on the signifier side of this new semiotic pattern—the signified is now
interpreted as both the campaign's message and part of the supporter's identity.
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Influence, therefore, now flows through a social reference process that can be
propelled by passive habits and choices. This is the importance of the maturation of
social media between 2004 and 2008: Dean supporters were able to wrap themselves
in political signifiers and influence the people around them, but only when they went
to the online equivalent of a Dean Rally. Obama supporters, however, were able to
wrap themselves in political signifiers as they went about their normal daily lives.
This change is not without precedents, so in my first chapter I endeavored to
explore some of the historical contexts that inform the evolution of this new structure
of communication. These may include every political use of electronic
communication since the telegraph, but for my purposes the most intuitive place to
start was the destabilization of the media model that preceded the one I aimed to
describe, namely broadcasting. I argued that Karl Rove's use of then-new database
technology in his campaigns for George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 reflected an early
recognition of the growing inadequacy of the model that had dominated the theory
and practice of political communication since Roosevelt's Fireside Chats. Rove knew
that the mediascape built on technologies designed to take a single message and send
it to as many people simultaneously as possible was becoming increasingly
fragmented and he saw the advantage of targeting specific communities with specific
messages. Dean saw the same advantage, I argue, but with the help of forward-
looking strategists like Joe Trippi who were prematurely committed to the death of
the broadcasting model, his campaign figured out how to use the internet to convene
the communities they wanted to talk to.
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In my second chapter I focus on the specific rhetorical tactics the Obama
campaign used to build its imagined communities. The goal of their communications
strategy was to make prospective supporters feel like they were engaged in a project
they shared with a large, energetic community. Again, this strategy works by
recognizing the two steps involved in the new structure of communication enabled by
social media. In order to achieve the first step, the candidate persistently used a
rhetoric that emphasized what Aristotle called ethos, persuasion based on the
credibility of the speaker. This created a degree of comfort and familiarity with the
candidate that helped encourage voters to let the campaign's messages into their
personal social mediascapes. Because social media demand that a campaign cede
control of its messages in order to achieve the second step in this model, ethos-driven
rhetoric also offers the advantage of focusing supporters' attention on the personal
qualities of the candidate rather than on the content of the message.18 And further
promoting their proliferation into and throughout social mediascapes, the messages
the campaign sent to supporters who let them in were encoded with the syntax of
solidarity, a series of rhetorical techniques that engender feelings of belonging and
equity in the imagined Obama community.
My third chapter is concerned with the second step in this new structure of
political communication. From my interviews with young Obama supporters in New
Hampshire in the final week of the campaign, I discovered three salient groups of
ideas: the power ofEasy, the power ofperception, and the power ofprojection. The
to
Recent resistance among former supporters aligned with the American political left to
policies like President Obama's continued prosecution of the war in Afghanistan that are
consistent with the campaign's platform demonstrates the campaign's successes in shifting
focus from the campaign's message to its brand.
100
Obama campaign made it easy for prospective supporters to be invited into the
conversation it was convening, with the powerful result that many young people who
might not otherwise have become engaged used social media tools (both the
campaign's and Facebook's) to join the imagined Obama community and start re-
producing or co-creating the campaign's messages. Perception is powerful because
we are now able to perceive more about our peers more easily with utilities like
Facebook than we have been in the past, with the result being that young people like
those I interviewed notice the political signifiers woven into their friends' online
identities. Finally, projection has always been powerful, but social media make it
more powerful in two new ways: actively projecting political expression for the
purpose of influencing other people is more efficient than it has been in the past, but
perhaps more importantly, the passive process of integrating branded signifiers into
our online identities now makes it possible to project political expression while
skirting the social complexities of active persuasion.
The limitations of my research are a function of those that constrained the
scope (geographic, temporal, and methodological) of my fieldwork. There remains
much fertile ground for further study; indeed, the implications of the structural shifts I
have identified demand scholarly attention. First, the widespread increase in civic
engagement among American young people throughout 2008 was a decisive force in
the campaign. Von Drehle (2008) writes that young supporters delivered the margin
by which Obama won the Iowa Caucus, an event that has attracted relatively few
voters under the age of thirty in the past. Research is needed to determine if the
former members of the Obama imagined community are still politically engaged and
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still expressing political ideas using social media. A decline in intensity is to be
assumed, but determining if the Obama phenomenon was ephemeral or more
permanent will impact future elections globally. There is also a great deal yet to be
learned about how, when and why Facebook users read their peers' profile pages.
Habits of so-called "Facebook stalking" should be better understood, I believe,
because the most important feature of the flows of influence into and throughout
social mediascapes is the passive projection of influence. Lynne told me she had
viewed the profiles of people from her hometown in Florida with whom she felt she
had little in common because she was curious about their politics. It would be
instructive to determine what habits and impulses shape the way young people are
observing their peers' politics on Facebook because a better understanding of these
dynamics could lead to broader questions about their systemic effect. For instance,
could social media lead to increased homogeneity of political opinion within
imagined communities?
These questions deserve to be asked because we are experiencing a moment in
which the fundamental structures governing the ways in which we communicate our
ideas and opinions are being rapidly, pervasively, and permanently transformed. I
believe messages like "Violet is hopeful for change" now command influence that is
potentially greater than the lofty oratory that inspire them. The opinion leaders in the
two step flow model that I have described are not the same people as those who
would have influenced the political opinions of their peers in the past because
deliberate persuasion is no longer part of the equation. Social media enable flows of
influence that demand so little action that the next generation of political activists
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might learn how to be more effective than their predecessors without being active.
And since so little action is required, the principal barrier that presumably deters
many would-be activists has been removed—anyone with an opinion can now be an
influential passive activist. I believe this new structure of political communication
will continue to promote political engagement as social media continue to become
more popular. If it does not, however, the disappointing conclusion we will likely be
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Consent Form To Participate In Research
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN:
Social Networks, Mediated Identities, and the Politics of Friending:
Barack Obama Supporters' Facebook Use in the 2008 New Hampshire Presidential
Primary
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by
David Godsall of the Media Studies department of Concordia University.
Department of Communication Studies
7141 Sherbrooke Street West






I have been informed that the purpose of the research is as follows: to explore the use
of social media, particularly the online social networking utility Facebook.com, as
sites ofpolitical discourse, information and influence flows, and emergent practices
of community- and identity-formation among American young people.
B. PROCEDURES
Interviews will be conducted in public places agreed upon by both the interviewer
and the subject. The time required for interviews will not exceed two hours per
session and efforts will be made to accommodate the schedules ofparticipants.
Digital recordings will be made and kept, but accessible only to the researcher and
research supervisor.
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS
The potential benefits derive from the opportunity to discuss new modes of civic
participation. Because interviews will focus on social networking utilities as sites of
new forms of political engagement, participation in this research process could serve
to empower interviewees in their own process of engaging with political issues.
Ill
The potential risks associated with the interview process, since participants' names
will not be used in any written work, are a function of individual subjects' degrees of
comfort with discussing issues of identity. These risks are assumed to be minimal.
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation
at any time without negative consequences.
• I understand that my participation in this study will be kept CONFIDENTIAL if I so
choose.
• I understand that the data from this study may be published.
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.
NAME (please print)
SIGNATURE
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University,
at (514) 848-2424 x7481 or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca.
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SUMMARY PROTOCOL FORM
UNIVERSITY HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
IMPORTANT:
Approval of a Summary Protocol Form (SPF) must be issued by the applicable Human
Research Ethics Committee prior to beginning any research project using human participants.
Research funds cannot be released until appropriate certification has been obtained.
FOR FACULTY AND STAFF RESEARCH:
Please submit a signed original plus THREE copies of this form to the UHREC c/o the Office
of Research. GM-1 000. Allow one month for the UHREC to complete the review.
FOR GRADUATE or UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH:
- if your project is included in your supervising faculty member's SPF, no new SPF is required
- if your project is supported by external (e.g. CIHR, FQRSC) or internal (e.g. CASA, FRDP)
funds, the supervising faculty member must submit a new SPF on behalf of the student as per
faculty research above. The supervising faculty member MUST be listed as the Pl.
- if your project is NOT supported by external (e.g. CIHR, FQRSC) or internal (e.g. CASA,
FRDP) funds, the student must submit a new SPF to the relevant departmental committee.
Contact your department for specific details.
INSTRUCTIONS:
This document is a form-fillable word document. Please open in Microsoft Word, and tab
through the sections, clicking on checkboxes and typing your responses. The form will
expand to fit your text. Handwritten forms will not be accepted. If you have technical
difficulties with this document, you may type your responses and submit them on another
sheet. Incomplete or omitted responses may cause delays in the processing of your protocol.
1. SUBMISSION INFORMATION
Please provide the requested contact information in the table below:
Please check ONE of the boxes below :
E3 This application is for a new protocol..
r-i This application is a modification or an update of an existing protocol:
Previous protocol number (S):
2. CONTACT INFORMATION
Please provide the requested contact information in the table below:

















Co-Investigators / Collaborators University / Department E-mail
Research Assistants Department / Program E-mail
3. PROJECT AND FUNDING SOURCES
Project Title:
Social Networks, Mediated Identities, and the Politics of
Friending:
Barack Obama Supporters' Facebook Use in the 2008 New
Hampshire Presidential Primary
In the table below, please list all existing internal and external sources of research funding,
and associated information, which will be used to support this project- Please include
anticipated start and finish dates for the project(s). Note that for awarded grants, the grant







4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH OR ACTIVITY
Please provide a brief overall description of the project or research activity. Include a
description of the benefits which are likely to be derived from the project. Alternatively, you
may attach an existing project description (e.g. from a grant proposal).
This thesis research will explore the use of social media — particularly the online
social. networking utility Facebook.com— as sites of political discourse, information
and influence flows, and emergent practices of community- arid identity-formation
among American young people. By examining the Facebook use ofyoung
Americans who were actively engaged in Barack Obama's 2008 New Hampshire
Presidential Primary campaign, I will investigate the increasing importance of
this new medium as a distinct sphere of American civil society and ask what role
it has played in the promotion of civic engagement and democratic participation.
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5. SCHOLARLY REVIEW /MERIT
Has this research been funded by a peer-reviewed granting agency (e.g. CIHR, FQRSC,
Hexagram)?
? Yes Agency:
If your research is beyond minimal risk, please complete and attach the
^ M Scholarly Review Form, available here:
http://oor.concordia.C3/REC/lurms.shtml
6. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
a) Please describe the group of people who will participate in this project.
The subjects I intend to interview for this project are individuals under the age of 30 who
registered as volunteers with the New Hampshire Obama campaign offices before the
January 2008 primary election and who are eligible to vote in the November 4* genera!
election. These individuals must also be active Facebook.com users.
b) Please describe in detail how participants will be recruited to participate. Please attach to
this protocol draft versions of any recruitment advertising, letters, etcetera which will be
used.
1 will recruit subjects by contacting university Obama suporter groups and Obama
campaign officials in Ne-W Hampshire. I expect campaign organizers to be able to suggest
individuals who meet my criteria and would be interested in helping with my research. Í
will also recruit subjects using my own contacts from my experience as a volunteer
organizer with the campaign.
c) Please describe in detail how participants will be treated throughout the course of the
research project Include a summary of research procedures, and information regarding
the training of researchers and assistants. Include sample interview questions, draft
questionnaires, etcetera, as appropriate.
My interviews will be short, informal, and relatively unstructured. Since my subjects are
young people volunteering their tinte, I will organize my process around the goal of
making them as comfortable and casual as possible. To this end, my interviews will be
conducted in neutral environments, like cafés and other public places. I expect these
interviews to require at least 30 minutes, but they will last only as long as my subjects feel
they want to continue.
I envision three groups of questions, all of which will be phrased in such a way as to invite
long, reflective responses. The first group of questions will all pertain to how the subject
uses Facebook and the second group of questions will focus on how the subject became
involved with the Barac'k Obama campaign. The third group of questions will be designed
to invite the subject to consider the ways they've been influenced by their peers through
Facebook, the ways they've influenced others using Facebook, and how these dynamics are
different from their interactions outside of the Facebook space.
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These interviews will be recorded using a digital recording device, but if a subject asks that
I not record any part of their responses this device will be turned off. Although biographical
and demographic information may be important for my research, the specific identities of
my interviewees are not relevant. I will, therefore, inform my subjects that they are free to
remain anonymous. I will ask that individuals who participate provide me with an email
address^ in case I have follow-up questions, but explain that I will try to avoid imposing on
their time after the initial interview.
The following examples indicate the general tone, style, and content of my questions:
1) îs the political identity you've constructed online the same as that which you use in
conversation, in the "real world"? if not, in what ways?
2) Is the identity you use online more politically active than the identity you use in school,
the workplace, or in "real world" social situations?
3) Are you more or less likely to accept or welcome advances of a political nature using a
social networking utility as medium?
4) Are you more likely to try to persuade a less politically active friend to support a political
candidate you favor using a social networking utility —by forwarding links and suggesting
groups — than you would be in person?
I will not be using research assistants.
7. INFORMED CONSENT
a) Please describe how you will obtain informed consent from your participants. A copy of
your written consent form or your oral consent script must be attached to this protocol.
Please note: written consent forms must follow the format of the template included at the
end of this document.
I will obtain consent by asking that individuals interested in participating complete and sign
the attached consent form.
b) In some cultural traditions, individualized consent as implied above may not be
appropriate, or additional consent (e.g. group consent; consent from community leaders)
may be required, ff this is the case with your sample population, please describe the
appropriate format of consent and how you will obtain it.
N/A
8. DECEPTION AND FREEDOM TO DISCONTINUE
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a) Please describe the nature of any. deception, and provide a rationale regarding why it
must be used in your protocol. Is deception absolutely necessary for your research
design? Please note that deception includes, but is not limited to, the following:
deliberate presentation of false information; suppression of material information; selection
of information designed to mislead; selective disclosure of information.
Deception is in no way part of my research methodology.
b) How will participants be informed that they are free to discontinue at any time? Will the
nature of the project place any limitations on this freedom (e.g. documentary film)?
The nature of my project will not place any limitations on participants' abili ty to discontinue
at any time. I will inform them verbally that they may end the interview at any time by saying
they do not want to continue. Additionally, they may continue without the interview being
recorded by asking that the recording device be turned off at any time.
9. RISKS AND BENEFITS
a) Please identify any foreseeable risks or potential harms to participants. This includes
low-level risk or any form of discomfort resulting from the research procedure. When
appropriate, indicate arrangements that have been made to ascertain that subjects are in
"healthy" enough condition to undergo the intended research procedures. Include any
"withdrawal" criteria.
I intend to conduct my interviews in a way that -will be less physically, emotionally, and
intellectually taxing than the tasks my subjects will Ixave performed while volunteering with
the campaign. Ì cannot forsee any discomfort resulting from these interviews for my subjects.
b) Please indicate how the risks identified above will be minimized. Also, if a potential risk or
harm should be realized, what action will be taken? Please attach any available list of
referral resources, if applicable:
I do not expect any harm to result from my interviews. If harm is realized by some
unforseeable means, I will take whatever reasonable action the interviewee requests.
c) Is there ä likelihood of a particular sort of "heinous discovery" with your project (e.g.
disclosure of child abuse; discovery of an unknown illness or condition; etcetera)? If so,
how will such a discovery be handled?
Because the individuals 1 will be interviewing are adults who volunteer their time, I don't
expect to make any such discoveries. My interviewees will selected from a group among
whoml percieve no particular vulnerabilities.
10. DATA ACCESS AND STORAGE
a) Please describe what access research participants will have to study results, and any
debriefing information that will be provided to participants post-participation.
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I will make my final product available to research participants and encourage them to read it.
I will not provide any debriefing information.
b) Please describe the path of your data from collection to storage to its eventual archiving
or disposal. Include specific details on short and long-term storage (format and location),
who will have access, and final destination (including archiving, or any other disposal or
destruction methods).
The data will be collected by me using a digital recording device and stored as an Mp3 file on
a hard drive in my home to which only I will have access.
11. CONFIDENTIALITY OF RESULTS
Please identify what access you, as a researcher, will have to your participant(s) ¡dentity(ies):
D Fully Anonymous
Researcher will not be able to identify who participated at






The participation of individuals will be tracked (e.g. to
provide course credit chance for prize, etc) but it would
be impossible for collected data to be linked to individuals
D Pseudonym
Data collected will be linked to an individual who will only
be identified by a fictitious name /code. The researcher
will not know the "real" identity of the participant.
D Confidential Researcher will know "real" identity of participant, but thisidentity will not be disclosed.
D Disclosed Researcher will know and will reveal "real" identity of
participants in results/ published material.
Participant Choice Participant will have the option of choosing which level ofdisclosure they wish for their "real" identity
D Other (please describe)
a) If your sample group is a particularly vulnerable population, in which the revelation of their
identity could be particularly sensitive, please describe any special measures that you will
take to respect thé wishes of your participants regarding the disclosure of their identity.
My sample group is not a particularly vulnerable population and the revelation of their
idenentities is not likely to be sensitive or become sensitive for any reason.
b) In some research traditions (e.g. action research, research of a socio-political nature)
there can be concerns about giving participant groups a "voice" This is especially the
case with groups that have been oppressed or whose views have been suppressed in
their cultural location. If these concerns are relevant for your participant group, please
describe how you will address them in your project.
These concerns are not relevant for my participant group.
12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
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a) Bearing in mind the ethical guidelines of your academic and/or professional association,
please comment on any other ethical concerns which may arise in the conduct of this
protocol (e.g. responsibility to subjects beyond the purposes of this study).
There are no other ethical concerns that could arise in the conduct of this protocol.
b) If you have feedback about this form, please provide it here.
I have none.
13. SIGNATURE AND DECLARATION
Following approval from the UHREC, a protocol number will be assigned. This number must
be used when giving any follow-up information or when requesting modifications to this
protocol.
The UHREC will request annual status reports for all protocols, one year after the last
approval date. Modification requests can be submitted as required, by submitting to the
UHREC a memo describing any changes, and an updated copy of this document.
I hereby declare that this Summary Protocol Form accurately describes the research
project or scholarly activity that I plan to conduct Should I wish to add elements to my
research program or make changes, I will edit this document accordingly and submit it
to the University Human Research Ethics Committee for Approval.
ALL activity conducted in relation to this project will be in compliance with :
• The Tri Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving
Human Subjects, available here:
http://www.pre.ethlcs.qc.ca/enqlish/policvstatement/policvstatement.cfm
• The Concordia University Code of Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Actions
Signature of Principal Investigator.
Date: October 22, 2008
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